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ABSTRACT
The thesis explores and analyzes critically current theories
and policies of socio-economic developmentin market-oriented
societies,with specific reference to three interrelated
developmental issues:
- the relationship between economic growth and
employment,
- the distribution of national income between wages
and profitsand,
- the relationship between social participation in
the process of production and the levels of individual
welfare.
The thesis focuses on the analysis of current theories/policies
and establishes the limits of their capabilities to explain/solve
the .problems of unemploymentinequityand social alienation
for the vaste majority of the populations in the developing
societiesespecially Latin American countries.
Specific reference will be made to the Argentinian context.
I argue throughout the thesis,that problems of unemployment,.
inequality and social alienation are neither aberrations nor
temporary dysfunctionalities,but are by and large the logical
and historical outcomes of the normal functioning of the
basic socio-economic institutions actually existing in these
societies.
From the holistic understanding of the relationships,constraints
and requirements implicit in the functioning of the socio-
economic institutions of market-oriented developing societies,
an embryonic model " of viable social organization emerges.
Thesis Spervisor: John R. Harris
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5This thesis attempts to study the conditions, characteristics
and problems of human work in market-oriented developing societies.
My interest in this subject derives from the belief that work is a
central activity in the relation of man to himself, to his community
and to his environment. Such a study therefore, relates directly
to an immediate concern in the quality of life and culture.
Much has been written about issues related to problems of un-
employment, income distribution and social welfare in developing
societies. Some of these writings are "purely" theoretical. But
mostly, they deal with policy issues and try to suggest problem
"solutions."
My study fits neither of these orientations.
I am not interested in formulating/evaluating a particular
policy (or set of policies) in the context of a particular society,
nor am I driven by "purely" theoretical and methodological interests.
My interest lies in the pragmatic desire of achieving social and
economic equality and of moving towards an institutional set up
which allows for the development of human potentiality and creativity.
In other words, my interests are practical interests in social
change. But reality can hardly be changed if it is not fully
understood. And this engenders a theoretical interest that is
inextricable from the practical interest in social change. A
theory is obviously needed to allow us to understand the functioning
of our current social order and the kinds of changes requisite for
the achievement of social and economic equality and of the fulfill-
ment of human potentiality and creativity.
6Many scholars/policy-makers/politicians working in developing
areas, in particular in Latin American countries express the need
to achieve similar social goals. And whether they make them explicit
or not, these scholoars/policy-makers/politicians also have theories
about society and about the ways to bring about social change.
However, after more than twenty years of repeated and diversi-
fied efforts (both national and international) starting in the
fifties, continuing through what the United Nations have called
the "Development Decade" in the sixties, and still being pursued
in the "Employment Decade" of the seventies, the results have been
extremely poor and discouraging. True, some countries, like Japan,
Taiwan and Brazil have been more successful than others in achieving
high rates of growth of national output.- But how successful have
they been in solving problems related to employment, distributional
equity, quality of life and environment, and institutional re-
sponsiveness? (and parenthetically how successful have the so-
called developed countries been on these scores and what accounts
for their increasing social malaise?)
The basic question that this thesis asks is: "Why is it that
the developing societies have failed to achieve these desired social
goals? I will attempt to show that to a large extent the failures
can be attributed to the fact that, typically, developmental
policies (supposedly implemented to help achieve goals of employ-
ment, equity and social participation) take as "given" the current
socio-economic institutions of market-oriented societies.
7I wili argue throughout this thesis, that problems of un-
employment, inequality and social alienation are neither aber-
rations nor temporary dysfunctionalities, but are by and large
the logical and historical outcomes of the normal functioning of
the basic socio-economic institutions actually existing in these
societies.
If these institutions are to remain unchanged there is indeed
little grounds for a greater optimism in the coming years as to
the likelihood of achieving these broader social and economic
goals.
My arguments will be developed with specific reference to
three interrelated developmental issues: 1) the relationship
between economic growth and employment (which relates to the
socio-economic problem of unemployment); 2) the distribution of
national income between wages and profits (which deals with the
problem of distributional inequity); and 3) the relationship
between social participation in the process of production and
the levels of individual welfare (which involves the understanding
of the problem of human social alienation in market-oriented
economies).
In Chapter I I will begin by briefly sketching some salient
aspects of socio-economic development in Argentina during the last
two decades. I will focus on the analysis of the theories/policies
used to explain/solve the problems of unemployment, inequity and
social welfare. I will proceed to analyze how the stated ob-
jectives of solving these problems failed to become a reality.
The main purpose of this introductory chapter is to use the
8example of Argentina (which is not atypical in any outstanding
sense) to find out the concrete theories/policies used to deal
with the aforementioned developmental issues and the concrete
outcomes which have followed the implementation of these theories/
policies in the last twenty years.
In the next three chapters (Chapters II through IV) I will
try to relate these three socio-economic problems to the normal
functioning of the basic socio-economic institutions of market-
oriented societies.
In Chapter II, I will analyze the likelihood of a market-
oriented economy to grow at the rate and in the direction, re-
quisite to absorb the entire labor force a developing society
into productive employment. In the same chapter, I will consider
the conditions under which a society faces a choice between more
output and more employment. This will be used later on to
establish the relations between the unemployment problem and the
functioning of our socio-economic institutions.
In Chapter III, I will discuss the socio-economic forces
which determine the distribution of national income between wages
and profits in a developing market-oriented economy. Given these
forces, I will then explore the likelihood of labor to augment its
share of the national product.
In Chapter IV, I will argue that the basic relations of man
to himself, to his community and to environment in market-oriented
societies are alienated and as such, alienation is a social problem
engendered by the normal functioning of our socio-economic institutions.
9These four chapters will provide a holistic understanding of
the relationships, constraints and requirements implicit in the
functioning of the socio-economic institutions of market-oriented
societies. This holistic understanding of the nature and functioning
of our basic market-oriented institutions serves as a spring-board
for attempts to overcome their inadequacies/failures in future
phases of social practice. It is important to emphasize that I
will not attempt to formulate an "alternative" institutional set
up. Such an attempt would be idle, utopian and undesirable.
Future forms of social organization will be determined historically
and only in the ongoing process of social practice itself. My
purpose is rather to attempt to understand more clearly the tasks
ahead and the general directions of structural changes called for
if society is to achieve its potential and development.
But in the process of attempting to understand the internal
logic of current socio-economic institutions, and to glean the
nature of the social tasks requisite to achieve the aforementioned
social goals, an embryonic "model" of viable social organization
inevitably emerges, at least in outline. And this is far from
being a utopian blue-print.
As a matter of fact, few communities in France, Italy, and
Israel are actually organized along similar lines. And much more
importantly, one fourth of the world population, the people of
Mainland China, are moving in solid practical and quite encouraging
steps, in the same general direction.
CHAPTER ONE:
EatONIC DEVEIDPMENTEMPLOYMENT AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION
IN ARGENTINA ; a case study.
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In this first chapter, I will take a specific historical
economic development, the one of Argentina in the last two decades,
and illustrate how the theories/policies used in this particular
context have failed to explain/solve the problems of unemployment,
inequity and social welfare.
Almost all official speeches in the political arena address
themselves to two explicit goals of development namely that of
economic growth and that of increased welfare for the entire popu-
lation, with greater prospects for opportunity and participation.
These goals are seen both as necessary and desirable for the achieve-
ment of a process of national development and integration. But once
these national objectives are stressed and repeatedly voiced, the
problem still remains as to how to achieve them.
Actually it has been aptly expressed that in the "Latin-
American context. . . employment is the principal institutional
mechanism for distributing income and opportunities among the
mass of the people. ." 1/ It is evident that, for most indi-
viduals and their families, lack of employment implies little or
no income, little or no opportunity, and, therefore low levels of
welfare. Thus, for the unemployed, or even the underemployed,
jobs would lead, as a rule, to higher levels of income and oppor-
tunity.
For the Argentinian governments, the means of achieving more
economic equity was indeed uniquely predicated upon the creation
of more jobs. But these jobs could only be created if the economy
was to grow at a significant rate of growth, for a long period of
time. This faith in a considerable increase in the national output
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as the means to resolve the unemployment problem in the long run,
relies heavily on the development theory of Raul Prebisch, official
advisor to the Argentinian government (and that of other economists
of the "monetarist school") according to which a significant in-
crease of the growth rate of the gross national product (of the
order of 8 per cent per annum for the next twenty years as R.
Prebisch requires in his report of the Inter-American Bank of
Development) - will be needed to allow for the "productive" em-
ployment of the entire labor force. This rate of growth would
correct the existing distortions in the occupational structure,
and anticipate for the expected increases in the labor force.
R. Prebisch writes, "The economic aspects of the problem
are not necessarily in contradiction with its social aspects,
but when growth is small, distribution is almost always bad.
The practice of social equity requires a high rate of growth. " 3
The faith that a process of sustained economic growth will
resolve the unemployment problem is still held today by the
Argentinian government and in the lately approved national plan
of development (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo y Seguridad 1971-1975
approved by the law No. 19.039) an average rate of growth of 7
per cent per annum is seen as a "national necessity." However
solving the unemployment/underemployment problem while maintaining
a high rate of growth seems to be only feasible if jobs are
created in sectors of high productivity per worker, namely in the
industrial sector. But given the time span that this process of
"productive absorption" of the labor force takes, and in order to
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avoid extra hardship on a large percentage of the unemployed
population, the Argentinian government (as did most Latin-American
governments) repeatedly looked upon the service sector as a
"momentary" solution for the creation of extra employment (over
and above the "normal" market demand of labor). Although, com-
pared to other countries of the region, the productivity per
worker has been relatively high in the agricultural sector of
Argentina, the government's prerogatives have still been to trans-
fer rural population to the more "productive" sector of the eco-
nomy, in order to achieve the desired rates of growth of national
output.
It should be said that compared to other countries of Latin
America, the urban unemployment problem has been less serious
a problem in Argentina than in the rest of the region, even with
the sluggish economic growth of the past decades. This is due
to mainly two factors: the low rate of population growth and
the adequate supply of natural resources (especially the rich-
ness of the soil). Indeed the annual rate of growth of the
population has only been of 2% per year between 1947 and 1960; and
has been even lower (1.7%) between 1960 and 1967. (This rate is
expected to decrease to 1.5% by 1980.)
The internal migrations between regions and especially between
rural and urban areas, have also been less intense in Argentina than
in other countries of Latin-America. Indeed the low density of 8
persons per square kilometre and the high ratio of arable land
accounts for the fact that the pressure on the land has never
been very great in Argentina. Still, Argentina has to be conceived
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of as an urban society with 70% of its total population living
in the cities (the capital and its surrounding province account
for already 48.5% of this percentage).
No precise official figures of overt urban unemployment
exist in Argentina. - Figures vary from 5 to 7%,of the total
working force, but as S. Barraclough, a scholar interested in
the social problems of Latin Americans stated: "overt unemploy-
ment is but the tip of the iceberg." How is the labor force
divided in Argentina and how has its composition changed over
the years?
TABLE I
ARGENTINA: OCCUPATIONS PER SECTOR 1950/1960
(in thousands and percentages)
1950 1960
Amount % Amount %
Agriculture 2,211 29.0 1,496 18.6
Mining 34 0.4 45 0.6
Manufacturing 1,782 23.3 2,104 26.9
Construction 503 6.6 501 6.2
Trade 866 11.3 995 12.3
Transport and Communication 464 6.1 572 7.1
Electricity, Gas and Water 57 0.7 75 0.9
Other Services 1,725 22.6 2,211 27.4
T 0 T A L 7,642 100.0 8,059 100.0
SOURCE: Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, 1965-69, Table 69.
Table I indicates that indeed the urban working force has
but that this increase was mainly absorbed by the service
increased,
sector.
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By 1960, more than 47% of the entire labor force was employed in
the service sector. The projections for 1980 are as follows:
TABLE II
1950 1960 1980
Agriculture 23.1 18.4 11.6
Industry 33.6 35.2 39.5
Services 43.3 46.4 48.9
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: A.Araoz: Los Recursos humanos en la industria Argentina,
2nd Ed., 1969, Instituto Torcuato Di Tella,CIE, Bs As.
According to these projections, employment is to increase
at an annual rate of 1.6% per annum (as compared to 1.5% of the
natural increase of the labor force). The highest rate of growth
is expected to come from the industrial sector, at a rate of 2.2%
per year, and productivity is expected to rise, in both the agri-
cultural and industrial sector.
These projections are summarized in Table III.
Product = at market prices in thousands of millions of pesos
(at 1960 currency)
Employment = thousands of persons
Productivity = thousands of pesos (at 1960 currency)
Reprinted from A. Araoz Op.Cit. Table II.
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TABLE III
ARGENTINA: PRODUCT, PRODUCTIVITY AND EMPLOYMENT, 1950-1980
1950 1960 1980
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Product 125 149 276
Employment 1,569 1,412 1,221
Productivity 80 105 226
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Product 288 413 1,245
Employment 2,281 2,704 4,146
Productivity 126 152 300
SERVICE SECTOR
Product 326 424 836
Employment 2,947 3,565 5,129
Productivity 111 119 163
TOTAL
Product 739 985 2,355
Employment 6,797 7,680 10,495
Productivity 109 128 224
SOURCE: CONADE, Educacion, Recursos Humanos and Desarrollo
Economico-Social, Buenos Aires, 1966, Table 52.
" (In the future) It is expected for the employment in the
agricultural sector to decrease even more (both in absolutely
and relatively), and for the employment in the rest of the economy
to expand, especially industrial employment. Manufacturing which
by 1960 already accounted for the provision of 75% of the jobs
of the industrial sector, is expected to increase even further
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its supply of jobs (from 2.15 million in 1960 to 3.3 million in
1980)... However these expected levels of employment, calculated
by the CONADE (National Development Council) may turn out to be
too optimistic. In such a case, we should expect....for the
labor force to be absorbed by the service sector, as it has
happened in the past years. "
If we follow the terminology used in the studies of the
Economic Commission for Latin America and distinguish between
the dynamic industries (paper, paperboard, stones, glass and
earth, chemical products, petroleum derivatives, machinery,
vehicles, metals and their manufacturing) and the lagging indus-
tries (foodstuffs, tobacco, textiles and their manufactures, wood
and its manufactures, printing, rubber products, crafts...) the
National Developmental Plan of 1965-1969 expected the former to
grow at a rate of almost 7% while the latter would grow at a rate of
only 3%. The generation of employment was expected to be 3.2% for the
former group of industries and 1.3% for the latter group.
If we compare however, the figures of "expected growth" of
the industrial sector of Argentina with those of the advanced
industrial societies, we are surprised. Indeed the Argentinian
government was planning on the manufacturing sector providing
for 43% of the total national product while in the United States
this sector only provided 28% of the GNP; in Great Britain 35.3%
and in France 36.8%. Furthermore despite the desired/planned high
levels of productivity per worker, the total level of employment
is still expected to rise from a 27.3% in 1960 to a 31% in 1980.
It is interesting to note that in more advanced societies the dynamic
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sectors employ a much lower percentage of the labor force (21.7% in
Japan, 27.4% in the U.S., 28% in France, 30% in Holland). 6/
If we analyze the data corresponding to the three greatest
urban industrial centers (Gran Buenos Aires, Cordoba and Rosario
which encompass 45% of the total population) at the end of the
past decade we see that the hopes were indeed ill founded. At
the end of the decade one third of the urban population was still
employed in the service sector.
Gran Buenos Aires Cordoba Rosario
Ind.Sect. Serv.Sect. Ind.Sect. Serv.Sect. Ind.Sect. Serv.
Sect.
1969 36.3 61.8 29.0 63.2 34.6 62
Reprinted from J.C.Rubinstein,'Urbanizacion,Estructura de Ingresos
y Movilidad Social en Argentina,1960-1970.ILDIS Santiago de Chile,1970.
But despite these discouraging results the above mentioned national
developmental plan for the years 1970-1975 still expect to employ
80% of the labor force in manufacturing, construction, trade and
services and achieve a rate of growth of 7 per cent per annum.
How are these expected results to be achieved and how realistic
are they?
For these results to be achieved large amounts of capital are
needed. Indeed investments are needed for the industrial sector
to expand; capital is needed to increase the productivity of the
agricultural sector. The Plan, is not, only extremely optimistic
as to the need to renew existing equipment and machinery but also
builds on an average capital-output ratio of 1.3 to 1.5, while most
other developing countries assume a capital-output ratio of
approximately 3, and in the past two decades the average capital-
output ratio for Argentina has been of more than 3.6
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Where could these investments come from and how realistic is
it to hope from them? In order to answer these questions a brief
history of the Argentinian economy in the past fifteen years seems
to be necessary.
First of all, however, we should recognize that the Argentinian
government underestimates the amount of investment needed by as-
certaining that production can be considerably increased if the
7/
already installed productive capacity would be fully utilized. -
Indeed, the degree of utilization of the installed capacity has only
been on the average of about 92% (and rarely exceeded 95%) and the
full utilization of the existing capacity would certainly lead to
higher levels of production. But besides this possibility, the
Argentinian government also argues that the national product can
only grow systematically if the productivity of the industrial
sector is to increase, and if this increase is to lead to a
process of steady growth, it should take place in the dynamic
sectors of the economy. Therefore investments should be directed
towards these dynamic sectors. This did not occur however in a
continuous and articulated way in the past, and repeatedly in-
flation was blamed for it.
Indeed, inflation is seen as leading to distortions in the
allocation of resources. Investments are put into "unproductive
activities" (housing, inventories~or else in projects which
guarantee immediate returns. Thus investments in the "dynamic
sectors" of the economy are extremely low, thus slowing the
19
process of economic growth. Inflation is also believed to bring
about difficulties in the balance of payments as inflation modifies
the exchange rates in international trade, encouraging imports
and discouraging exports. Sooner or later governments have either
to devaluate, or else to impose import controls. Furthermore,
inflation definitely leads to price distortions, to problems in
the financial market and to a general feeling of mistrust and
impoverishment which do not favor investments.
As a result of these problems, cgsed by the inflationary.
process, a set of concrete policies are suggested. W. Baer
summarizes them as follows:
Given all these distortions and balance of payments
difficulties resulting from the inflationary process, the
monetarist considers it a sine gua non for economic develop-
ment that the economy be rid of inflation and all the dis-
tortions it has brought along. Since he sees the root of
inflation as being an overabundant creation of money supply
through substantial government deficits and easy credit
policies, he will recommend stringent anti-inflationary
policies via: the curtailment of government expenditures
and/or increased collection of taxes to eliminate deficits;
the severe tightening up of credit; the elimination of
inflationary subsidies; the control of wage increases
(which is a necessary complement to control of credit
increases); and the elimination of subsidized exchange
rates (if there existed a system of multiple exchange
rates). 8/
The "monetarist" admits-that these policies might have an
adverse effect on the rate of growth. But once inflation is
stopped, both domestic and foreign investments will resume their
investment activities and sustained growth could be achieved.
The Argentinian government adhered to such a hope and in
December 1958 a stabilization program began. The plan, which
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was prepared by the International Monetary Fund adopted a unified
and freely fluctuating exchange rate, removed all foreign trade
controls, restricted credits and kept wages from increasing. Large
inflows of capital were also attracted: the IMF, itself, provided
important loans and the new law of December 1958 which allowed for
the unlimited repatriation of capital and profits, plus a change in
oil policy, certainly accounts for the large inflows of private
investments in the petroleum refineries, the petrochemical indus-
tries, the tractor industries and the metal-working industries
among others. The capacity in several import-competing and social
overhead sectors of the economy expanded. Foreign capital inflow
accounts for this increase but so does the reduction of the real
consumption of wage earners during this period.
However the external debt of both the public and the private
sectors grew sharply and the balance-of-payments equilibrium which
was expected to be reestablished by stimulating the output of ex-
portable goods (primarily those of the rural sector) could only
be achieved momentarily in 1959-1960, collapsing dramatically in
1962-1963. The national product declined by nearly 5 percent in
1959, although labor productivity in several branches of the
industrial had increased. "However the gains (in labor produc-
tivity were offset from the view of the economy as a whole by a
growing amount of open and disguised urban unemployment of labor
and excess capacity in many industries especially during 1959-1960
and 1962-1963." 9
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Indeed the stagnation of the economy in 1959 brought about
a reduction of the level of employment and of the real wages of
the industrial working class. This occasioned, in turn, the severe
reduction of private consumption while prices went up considerably
at the same time as a result of the peso devaluation, the strong
taxes on imports, and the elimination of government subsidies to
public services. In 1959 wholesale prices went up by 133%, but
wages in the industrial only increased by 68%. This severe de-
crease of the real wages of the labor force in the industrial
sector, was at the root of the labor conflicts and social unrest
observed that same year.
These conflicts resulted in the necessity to modify the sta-
bilization plan of 1959 and emphasis in the years 1960-1961 was
put to reactivate and expand production and employment, without
having to increase prices. This approach, taken in 1960, expected
prices to rise only as a result of an increase of costs of produc-
tion (and depending a great deal on the inflationary expectancies
of the entrepreneurs). Departing from an idle capacity, the
government expected to be able to simultaneously expand production
through an increase of demand and stop inflation through appropriate
monetary and fiscal policies. Demand was to be reactivated through
an increase on consumption and investment both public and private
(direct government investment in "dynamic sectors" of the economy
was made possible by foreign loans which increased in 1960 by
180 millions of dollars) and deliberate private investment in
sectors of high profits, i.e., oil were induced. The results of
this approach was on the one hand a total gross domestic product
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recovery during 1960 (8% increase) and further expansion during
1961 (7%), but by 1961 it had reached a level of only 7 percent
above 1958. This increase of production went together with an
increase of imports of machinery and equipment financed by
foreign investments, but the volume of exports did not rise. A
fall of the agricultural production originated a decrease of
exports of 7.6% and by the end of 1961 the current account showed
a deficit of 580 millions of dollars.
On the other hand, the failures of the stabilization plan of
1959 to stop inflation via the reduction of demand, induced the
government in the years 1960/1961 to stop the increase of prices
by acting directly on the costs of production. The idle installed
capacity favored this strategy and wholesale prices went up only
15.7% and 8.3% in 1960 and 1961 (as compared to 133% in 1959).
This low increase of costs was mainly due however, to a slowing
down of the annual increase in industrial wages. Annual wage
increases declined from 68% in 1958 to a 17% in 1960 and 25%
in 1961.
The result was the low rate of inflation in 1961 (it was
the lowest in the whole decade) which created an unsustainable
exchange policy. At the end of 1961, the necessity to correct
external imbalances throug a new devaluation was seen as a
must, but this was to affect again the costs of production.
In 1962 the peso was devaluated and what followed were the
national government policies of 1962-63.
The policies adopted were essentially similar to the ones
suggested in the stabilization plan of 1958. The results were also
similar. Output per capita decreased 8.6% while wholesale prices
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went up 67.8%. Wages were not able to catch up at such a rate,
and real wages were substantially reduced in 1962-1963 at a level
15% lower than in 1958. Unemployment has never been so high:
One third of the workers in the textile and metallurgic
branches were actually unemployed. Strikes, unrests, social and
political instabilities were the obvious results.
The terrible crisis of 1963 induced the national government
to adopt a "reactivation" policy in 1964/1965 very similar in
principle to the one of the years 1960-1961. The basic idea was
to increase production in order to utilize the idle capacity
(56.3% in 1963) produced by a considerable decrease of the per
capita/output. However, while in 1960-1961 the dynamic element
in this reactivation was expected to be the expansion of invest-
ments both public and private, in 1964 reactivation was mainly
based on an expected expansion of private consumption. In 1964
money wages increased by 30% and a 70% increase of the financing
of government expenditures through the banking system allowed
for a considerable increase of the private sector's consumption
capacity. Gross national product increased of 13.4% in this
period but inflation, although slightly slowed, could not be
controlled, given the annual increase of the costs of production:
Wholesale prices increased by 56%.
1966 was again a year of economic recession, and high un-
employment (5.2% of the labor force was "officially"recognized
as being unemployed), and 1967 was one of the most negative years
for the Argentine economy (1963 was equally deplorable): only
83.3% of its full capacity was utilized (65% of its capital) and
24
unemployment increased 0.9% in just one year.
Given these characteristics, a similar expansion strategy was
considered in 1967-68 as in the years 1960 and 1964. Consumption
was to be stimulated to increase production (with a direct control
over inflation to stop increases in costs of production). But
the external conditions were different. While, in the early
years, it was easy to channel foreign investments in sectors
which substituted for imports, (such as tractors, automobiles,
etc...) sectors in which there was an obvious demand; in the
later years there was a necessity to expand and induce demand but
private entrepreneurs did not find investments as attractive as
they used to see them. In 1967 industrial output decreased further
by 0.4% with its natural corollary as to unemployment.
, As to action on the inflation process, the national govern-
ment first readjusted wages, public services charges, import
regulations, inducing a 25.7% increase in wholesale prices and
then tried to decelerate inflation by maintaining the level of
the established costs of production.
At the end of 1968 wages had to be controlled again. Prices
were expected to stabilize, but inflation could not be stopped.
Production was expected to increase but did notbut unemployment
did increase and so did the cost of living.
In 1969 the social and economic situationwas unsustainable.
The result was the "Cordobazo" which finally overthrew the
government in 1970.
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It is certainly not possible in five pages to describe
fifteen years of the economic history of a country. But such
an analysis was not the intention of this thesis. Even at the
risk of oversimplifying, the intention was to present an over-
view of the main governmental policies adopted, of the results
obtained, of the difficulties encountered.
What can we conclude from such an overview?
It seems that the government policies in Argentina, from
1958 to 1970, can broadly be divided in two categories: -
a) those that I have called stabilization plans (1959,
1962/63, 1968/1969), which focused mainly on stopping or
slowing down inflation; and,
b) those that I have called reactivation plans (1960/61;
1964/1965; 1966/1967) which had as a main objective to
expand production and increase employment.
The former policies can be considered to be based funda-
mentally on "three hypotheses, or with more precision, on three
dogmas, either openly accepted or tacitly. supposed.
According to the first postulate,free market forces produce
general patterns of investment, production and consumption socially
desirable.
The second postulate...states that internal and external
disequilibriums--inflation, deficit in the balance of payments--
are due to an excessive domestic demand...
The third postulate is based on the belief that market forces
free of government intervention, or inflation perturbances, will
generate an increase of output and employment without any difficulties
in the balance of payments." -1/
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The first postulate originated actions along the line of a
removal of controls over prices, and of subsidies to production
and consumption; and mainly a devaluation of the currency to an
exchange rate which would reflect "real market"conditions.
The second postulate was responsible for the restrictive
monetary and fiscal policies.
The first governmental policy undertaken in 1959 was a
strong devaluation of the peso. But the immediate effect of
devaluations, besides all the other deflationary policies was
an increase of prices of consumption goods.
When politically it was not possible to maintain a further
restriction on wages (given the increase of the costs of living),
then wages went up, but this increase was reflected back in
higher prices, giving rise again to a wage-price inflationary
spiral. However, the nominal wages could not increase at the
same speed as prices, producing a considerable lag in the growth
of the real wages.
In the first stabilization plan, the economic situation was
more favorable given the large flows of foreign investment and
attractive "opportunities" for the private sector. But the large
private capital outflows and the need to pay back foreign loans;
plus the inadequate increase of the national product were still
at the root of a serious disequilibrium in the balance of pay-
ments. However in later stabilization plans, the reduction of
public and private investments and the reduction of real wages
were at the root of a reduction of the level of economic activity.
Economic depression was followed by a strong increase of unemployment
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aggravated by the natural increase of the labor force and by
the negative economic instances by which the country was going
through.
The only way out seemed to be an increase of the economic
activity and the results were the reactivation plans undertaken
by the national government. These plans still believe in the
first postulate but base their actions on a second postulate
according to which through an increase of private and public
consumption and investment, ouput will grow and correct the
imbalances in the balance of payments.
The government objective was to expand the economy by acting
on the autonomous components of the global demand for more goods
and services. Wages were increased in order to expand private
consumption, investments both private and foreign were encouraged.
These factors induced an increase of output subject to two main
constraints. First, private investments were only important in
sectors where the demand was certain and the returns high; while
they began to decay when the conditions were not so favorable.
Secondly, the increases of demand were related on the one side
to the increase of exports subject to international trade condi-
tions (and these expansions became more and more difficult), and
on the other, to the level of real income of the population and
their possibility and willingness to consume. Consumption did
rise, and so did prices,setting up again the inflationary spiral.
Furthermore, as the expansion of the economy is always depending
on the imports of capital goods whose prices were always higher
than the prices of the products they are to produce, serious dis-
equilibriums in the balance of payments always appear. Devaluations,
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sooner or later, appear as a necessity, setting up again the whole
economic business cycle.
These fluctuations are easily observable in the following
table.
TABLE IV
Argentina 1955-1966
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
I
5.0
-0.2
3.6
5.3
-7.7
6.1
5.1
-3.7
-5.5
6.2
6.7
-2.4
II
12.3
13.4
24.7
31.6
113.7
27.3
13.5
28.1
24.1
22.1
28.6
32.3
III
43.0
42.6
41.4
43.3
37.8
38.4
39.9
39.1
39.1
38.2
39.1
39.8
IV
-175
- 19
- 60
-217
113
161
- 57
-234
202
- 11
139
53
References
Column I
Column II
Column III
Column IV
Variation of the gross national income (in % over the
past year).
Banco Central de la Republica Argentina, Crigen del
producto y composicion del gasto nacional, Suplemento
del Boletin Estadistico No. 6, 1966 y C. Diaz Alejandro,
Essays on The Economic History of the Argentine Republic,
Yale University Press, 1971.
Annual inflation (% over the past year).
C. Diaz Alejandro, op.cit. (living costs in Gran Bueonos
Aires).
Wages and Salaries (% of the gross national income of
that year).
CEPAL, El desarrollo economico y la distribucion del
ingreso en la Argentina, 1968.
Changes in the balance of payments (in millions of American
dollars)
C. Diaz Alejandro, op.cit.
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This table summarizes the economic processes which we have
been describing. But what influence have these fluctuations had
on the distribution of national income?
On the average per capita income increased at the low rate
of 1.3 per cent per annum during this period, with considerable
fluctuations from year to year (as shown in the first column of
Table IV). The relative shares of wages and salaries of the
national product during this period, decreased from 43.0 per-;cent
to 39.8 per cent despite the fact that by 1961 the average pro-
ductivity per man was already 23 per cent higher than in 1953. 12/
How were these over-all changes distributed among sectors?
Devaluations always intend to improve the disequilibrium in
the balance of payments as relative prices of exportable to impor-
table goods are modified. As such devaluations always benefited
in Argentina, the agricultural sector and to a certain degree too
the financial sector. But they also produced a rise in the prices
of imports and food products, initiating an inflationary process
which certainly went against the interests of the urban sector.
In the meantime too, government policies intending to stop the
inflationary process freezed wages and adopted fiscal and monetary
policies which acted as disincentives to the industrial urban sector
thus curtailing production and employment.
These policies -seriously affected the urban sector - and
pressures slowly built up. Wage increases were generally concerted
and inflation slowly eroded the negative effects of devaluation on
the urban population. The concrete result of the "cycles" is the
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extreme instability of income of the different sectors of the
national economy which is expressed in Table 5.
TABLE V: INTERSECTORIAL CHANGES OF INCOME,
ARGENTINA 1958-1965
Rural
Agriculture 12.1 34.8 -20.8
Urban
Industrial 4.8 10.1 - 8.5
Construction 7.8 37.5 -11.1
Transport and Communication 4.4 12.7 - 6.7
Government 8.1 14.3 -17.0
Electricitygas and water 10.1 37.5 -20.0
References
Column I Average (absolute) variations of income for each
sector during the period. (%)
Column II Year of highest positive change (% over past year)
Column III Year of highest negative change (% over past year)
SOURCE: CEPAL, El desarrollo economico y la distribucion del
ingreso en la Argentina, 1968.
What can we conclude from such an analysis?
The trends are clear. The distribution of national income
between wages and profits (including the government sector) has
remained fairly constant, with a slight decrease in the labor's
share. The struggle seems therefore to be between the rural
owners and the non-wage earners of the industrial sector, as
to whom is to get the greatest share out of the national income.
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The inflationary impact of the struggle may be momentarily slowed
down by a further decrease in the real income of the wage-earners.
But especially in the industrial urban sector, wage-earners are
strongly unionized and manage to create enough political pressure
as to regain soon their losses and political struggles emerge
again.
However the struggles are in the long run ficticious. 30%
of the population still holds the power and receives as such
66.7% of the national income (top 1 per cent 16.3; 8th decile
10; 9th decile 13.2; 10th decile 40.9) while the rest of the
population struggles to find its way out, maintain its position
and find a job. It is only their organized political action,
strikes, protests, unrests, that has assured them a stationary
socio-economic position.
It be-comes now redundant to ascertain that given past
historical trends the optimism of the actual government as to
the possibilities of increasing the employment opportunities and
the prosperity for greater participation for the great majority
(70%) of the national populationare totally ill founded. Is
the impossibility to achieve these goals specific to the Argenti-
nian context, or are these goals unachievable in other developing
societies too? Is this impossibility related to unique structural
problems of the Argentinian economy, or is this impossibility
inherent to the actual functioning of these societies?
It is to the analysis of these questions that I turn now.
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This section of the paper concentrates on the employment
issue, in its relation to economic growth. As shown in the
earlier section, the policies adopted by the Argentinian govern-
ment during what I have called the reactivation periods were
based on the faith that a substantial growth of the economy (as
measured by a considerable increase of national output) will
automatically and in the long-run resolve the unemployment prob-
lem. In the meanwhile, the commercial and the public sectors
were expected to meet the employment needs of the increasing
labor force that concentrated in the urban centers. The agri-
cultural sector was expected to maintain its high level of
underemployment.
In the first part of this section, I will address myself to
the problem of how likely it is -- in the near future -- for out-
put to grow at the rate and in the direction requisite for ab-
sorbing the entire labor force in Soductive employment. A cor-
relate of this is an investigation of the factors which determine
both the rate and the direction of economic growth in a developing
society.
In the second part, I will analyze the conditions under which
a society faces a choice between more output and more employment.
Such an analysis is necessary to understand the link between our
socio-economic institutions and our persistent incapacity to re-
solve the unemployment problem.
1. The Problem of Growth
The idea that the preservation of full employment in a capi-
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talist economy requires a growing output goes back as far as
classical economic theory and in particular to marxian economics.
Its modern revival, after years of little consideration, however,
started with the papers published by both Harrod and Domar in
the late 1940's.
The Harrod-Domar model in a highly simplified version can
be summarized as follows:
"* . . , the possibility of steady growth
in a model of a fixed capital-output ratio
C and a fixed savings-output ratio S is
established. A unit of capital will pro-
duce 1/C unit of output, which in its turn
will generate s/C units of net savings
(i.e., addition to capital stock), so that
the rate of growth of the capital stock
will equal s/C. Since output is propor-
tional to capital, that will be the rate
of growth output as well." 1
Assume an initial stage of full-employment. For full-
employment to be maintained, given the increase in the labor
force and in its productivity, national income must grow at the
"combined rate" of growth (of both the labor force and its pro-
2
ductivity).
But, as J. Robinson remarked: "The rate of increase in pro-
3
ductivity of labor is not something given by Nature", but is
dependent on capital goods, i.e., on capital already utilized.
A. Sen (ed.), Growth Economics, Penguin Books, Ltd., Harmonds-
worth, Middlesex, England, 1970, page 10.
2
E. Domar, "Capital Expansion, Rate of Growth and Employment",
Econometrics, Vol. 14, 1946, page 138.
3
J. Robinson, "The Economics of Full Employment", Economic
Journal, Vol. 55, page 79.
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Labor productivity is not a function of technological progress
in the abstract, but of technological progress embodied in capi-
tal goods as well as of the amount of capital goods already
existing. There are even instances where (at least during cer-
tain phases of development) capital accumulation without techno-
logical progress increases labor productivity both because more
capital per man is used and because there is a logical shift of
labor to industries that use more capital and can afford to pay
higher wages.
If labor productivity is directly affected by capital ac-
cumulation it becomes obvious why an immense part of growth eco-
nomics as applied to developing societies discusses the growth
process as engendered by the accumulation of capital subject only
to a constraint related to the supply of labor. "Growth pro-
ceeds with capital accumulation with a given capital-output
ratio as long as the labour requirement at the current level of
4
productivity does not exceed the size of the force."
In a dynamic model of a developing economy in which the ac-
cumulation of capital and its productivity, as well as the growth
of the labor force and its utilization, is modified constantly
through time, the problem of accelerating growth while maintain-
ing (or achieving) full-employment can only be achieved when:
S = n +m (1)
4
A. Sen, op.cit., page 16.
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where n is the rate of growth of the labor force
m is the rate of labor-saving technical progress
and as before,
S is the savings-output ratio
and C is the capital-output ratio
What is this equation saying? Where is this equality possible?
Are there any adjustment mechanisms that are likely to bring both
terms close enough in developing economies? Are these mechanisms
inherent in the normal functioning of the socio-economic system?
Ultimately, this equation is saying that if the economy is growing
at a rate of S and if this rate exceeds the rate of growth given
by n + m, the economy will achieve full-employment but it can
no longer grow; if on the other hand the reverse is the case, the
economy can grow further even if high levels of unemployment exist,
hoping for future adjustments to happen. Any of the four varia-
bles can be individually or jointly used to "serve the cause of
adjustment, and indeed all the four avenues (and combinations
thereof) have been explored in the literature on economic devel-
5
opment at various levels of satiistication."
Let us examine the degree of maleability of these four vari-
ables and what forces influence their values.
In subsection l.a. below, I will examine the conditions which
limit the rate of growth of capital accumulation (S).
In the subsection that follows, l.b., I will turn to an in-
s
A. Sen, op.cit., page 16.
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vestigation of the conditions and limitations facing the increase
of productivity of capital (C).
Subsequently, I will examine in subsection 2.a. the factors
which induce us to look at the growth of the labor force (n) and
in subsection 2.b. I will analyze the direction of technical
progress (n).
l.a. Capital Accumulation
To analyze the investment capacity of a developing economy
I will postulate, as J. Robinson does,
". . . an economy in which there are no border-
line cases between firms and households (such
as peasant families) and no border-line cases
between saving and spending (such as buying
a house)." 6
The analysis in this section will try to show how the rate
of accumulation of capital is determined and limited by the con-
trol of capitalists over the process of production and by the
distribution of income between workers and capitalists which this
control implies and engenders. This amounts to belief that the
encouragement of the level of domestic savings necessary to pro-
mote the desired capital accumulation cannot be brought about
without major institutional changes. The need for major institu-
tional changes will be discussed further in the next section.
6
J. Robinson, "A Model of Accumulation" in Essays in the
Theory of Economic Growth. Macmillan, 1962, p.36 .
The same assumptions have also been used by most of the so-
called Cambridge models of growth.
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Let us therefore analyze the relationships between the
role of savings, the mode of production and the distribution
of income. For this purpose I will assume, at least in the
first part of the analysis, that there is full use of the in-
7
stalled capacity. If there is full use of capacity and if
the productivity of capital cannot be improved, then the rate
of growth of output must depend solely on the growth of capital.
Thus neo-classical economists argue that present consumption
slows future growth of output (since it slows growth of capital).
As such, the neo-classical point of view naturally urges that
workers' and capitalists' consumption both be kept as low as
possible in order to foster more rapid economic growth.
However, the workers' consumption ratio out of additional
wage income and the entrepreneurs' consumption ratio out of ad-
ditional profit income is far from being equal. The fact that
the capitalists' propensity and ability to save is much higher
justifies the search for, and the creation of, incentives
towards a shift from wages to profits, i.e., a shift towards a
different distribution of income between wages and profits, in
which profits would have a larger share, as a means to decrease
the aggregate consumption ratio, thereby increasing the ratio
of investment to income and thus increasing the rate of growth
of output.
Furthermore, the fact that in a developing society both
7
This is the extreme case where a perfectly elastic labor supply
co-exists with perfectly inelastic capital supplies.
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wages and workers' consumption tend to be at a minimum (con-
sistent only with the workers' subsistence needs of both health
and incentives to work) increases the reasons for looking upon
the capitalists as the salvation board for more productive in-
vestment.
L. Pasinetti's research in this area is extremely relevant:
"This is the most striking result of our
analysis. It means that in the long run,
workers' propensity to save, though in-
fluencing the distribution of income be-
tween capitalists and workers does not
influence the distribution of income be-
tween profits and wages. Nor does it
have any influence whatsoever on the rate
of profit... Second, the relevance of
the capitalists' propensity to save which
is the only one to appear ... uncovers
the absolutely strategic importance for
the whole system of the decisions to save
of just one group of individuals: the
capitalists. The particular saving func-
tion of this group transforms the open
proportionality relation
Pw = Pc into a definitive function in
which the proportion that profits must
bear to savings in the whole system, is
given by the saving propensity of one
single category of individuals. The simi-
lar decisions to save of all the other in-
dividuals, the workers, do not count in
this respect. Whatever the workers may
do, they can only share in an amount of
total profits which for them is predeter-
mined; they have no power to influence
it at all." 8
L. Pasinetti, "Rate of Profit and Income Distribution in Rela-
tion to the Rate of Economic Growth", Review of Economic
Studies, Vol. 23, 1961-2. page 275.
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where Pc and Pw stand for profits which accrue to the capitalists
and profits which accrue to the workers; Sw stands for the
workers' savings and Sc for the capitalists' savings.
These conclusions derived by Pasinetti in 1961 reinforce
the old "classical idea" of a strong relation between the savings
of that group of individuals who are in the position to carry on
the process of production and the process of capital accumulation.
It simply follows from the principle that profits are distributed
in proportion to ownership of capital. As such, in analyzing
the process of capital accumulation we become interested in very
specific kinds of decisions: capitalists' decisions concerning
9
savings out of profits as such.
But the crucial question to ask is what makes capitalists
spend/inves't out of their profits the way they do? What deter-
mines both their level of investments and its composition?
I will show here how unrealistic it is in market-oriented
developing economies to work towards a redgition of consumption,
on the part of the capitalists as means to increase investment
and how, on the contrary, it is only an increase of the aggregate
demand or a reduction of production costs, which can engender an
increase of supply (production/investment), given the functioning
of our current socio-economic institutions.
9
In a similar way, both Keynes and Kalecki have been interested
in the consumption patterns of the capitalists. See their posi-
tion in N. Kaldor: "Alternative Theories of Distribution" in
Essays on Value and Distribution, G. Buckworth & Co., Ltd. London
1960, Part V, pages 227-236.
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Aside from a few dissenters, whole generations of economists
(both classical and neo-classical) based their theories of pro-
duction on Say's Law which postulates that an increase of supply
would call "forth an equal amount of demand" through automatic
market processes. Economists admit only the possibility of tem-
porary imperfections in the market in one sector or the other,
imperfections which if acted upon would establish the competitive
characteristics of the market which assure mobility of capital
from one sector to another and the elimination of "involuntary"
unemployment or "excessive" supply.
The kernel of truth in Say's law is the platitude that supply
equals demand at every moment if we consider that every purchase
constitutes a sale, and every sale means wage or profit income to
someone, which again is used for more purchases.
Ricardo phrased the argument for Say's law in this way:
"No man produces but with a view to con-
sume or sell, and he never sells but with
an intention to purchase some other com-
modity which may be useful to him or
which may contribute to future production.
By purchasing them, he necessarily becomes
either the consumer of his own goods, or
the purchaser and consumer of the goods
of some other person." 10
Classical and neo-classical belief in Say's law implies con-
fidence in market mechanisms as a means of achieving maximum effi-
ciency in the allocation of resources. Misallocations, inequi-
ties, inefficiencies, etc., are, accordingly, caused by market
imperfections which are seen as the major impediment for the
10
D. Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation.
Gonner, Bell & Sons, Ltd., London, 1831, page 273.
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achievement of a stage of equilibrium in which supply equals de-
mand. However, if that stage is attained with maximum efficiency
in the allocation of resources and maximum welfare for both the
consumer and the producer, would be achieved. The optimism in
the possibility of achieving that "optimum" is totally unwarrented
and does not hold against any historical analysis.
As H. Sherman tried to establish, the belief in Say's law
must be wrong as applied to contemporary economics:
"Say's law is, indeed, true for certain
earlier types of economics, the mistake
was in taking these simpler economics as
a model, and then applying the conclusions
to the modern private enterprise economy
without considering the fact that en-
tirely new institutions have evolved since
the medieval period." 11
As long as most economists accepted Say's law (which says
that there cannot be a general deficiency of effective demand rela-
tive to supply), there were only a few logically possible explana-
tions for the fluctuations of aggregate output. The most frequent
line of explanations forwarded by economists concentrated on the
reaction of economy to "external" or noneconomic forces affecting
demand and supply.
So far, however, Say's law has only been attacked by Malthus,
Marx, Keynes and their respective followers. In rejecting Say's
law they intended to explain the depression capitalists' business
cycles independently of the shortcomings in the supply of output.
11
H. Sherman, Macrodynamic Economics. Growth, Employment and
Prices. Appleton-Century Crofts, New York, 1964, p. 9.
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Although their explanations differ, they do have in common the
acceptance of a lack of effective demand as a possible and fre-
quent economic stage, generated by the normal functioning of a
12
market-oriented economy. The most frequent explanation of
depressions has been forwarded in relation with the "undercon-
sumptionist approach" that argues for the need to enlarge the
markets given that a lack of consumers' demand causes a fall of
investments and a recession in economic activities. This ob-
jective relationship between a stationary demand and a fall in
investments can, however, be interpreted in different ways. The
point of view of the more conservative is that the relative de-
cline in consumer spending merely reflects the saving desires of
individuals as their incomes rise above their already satisfied
basic needs. The problem, in this framework, becomes one of in-
ducing individuals to spend above their actual pattern of con-
sumption.
This position considers individuals' consumption patterns to
be independent of their position in the income distribution spec-
trum and unaffected by "external" economic factors: prices, de-
pressions, etc.. A more realistic explanation of the causes of
12
The distinction will be made recurrently, between market-
oriented and non-market-oriented economies. The accent will
be put on the different socio-economic institutions which they
both imply. It seems to be appropriate and necessary to dis-
tinguish between a non-planned (or quasi) market-oriented economy
(Western model), a planned market-oriented economy (Yugoslavia,
U.S.S.R.) and a "socialist" non-market-oriented economy (China).
A full development and explanation of the institutions will be
given in the next chapter.
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limited consumption, especially in a developing economy where
a marginal increase or decrease of the national income's share
of the low income groups considerably affect their social con-
sumption patterns, should take into account the shifts in the
distribution of income.
Empirical data has tended to show that the average consump-
tion ratio, in business cycles, falls in prosperity and rises in
depression but that in the long-run the average consumption ratio
remains almost constant. This long-run constancy has been ex-
plained in different ways by several economists dealing with con-
13
sumers' behavior. But most of the explanations, however, are
based on the "relative income" hypothesis which argues that the
percentages of his income that an individual spends in consump-
tion depends on his position in the spectrum of income, and as
such, the consumption pattern of any society depends on its actual
14
distribution of income. If the distribution of income is
constant over time there is then no obvious reason for the aggre-
gate consumption ratio to change. Furthermore, given that workers'
wages are all, or almost all, spent on consumption whereas most of
the capitalists' profits are not consumed explains why a fall in
the wage share of national income during the expansion of the
13
See, e.g., J.S. Duesenberry, Income, Saving, and the Theory of
Consumer Behavior, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.,
1943, or the quite different hypothesis in M. Friedman, A Theory
of the Consumption Function, Princeton University Press, Prince-
ton, N.J., 1957.
14
J.S. Duesenberry, op.cit.
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15
economy restricts consumption. Studies done in advanced econ-
omies showed that workers spent 85 per cent of additional wage in-
come on consumption while capitalists spent only 40 per cent of
16
additional profits on consumption (and the latter percentage
was based only on the personal income of capitalists and not the
retained profit of corporations which obviously enough does not
go for consumption).
The restricted growth of consumers' demand is even more
limited in a developing economy with a stable or declining wage
share of national income. (The determination of shares of
national income will be treated separately in section II of this
chapter.) This restricted growth of consumer demand lowers the
attractiveness of the market and causes a fall in investments.
This statement opposes the classical view that a shift from wages
to profits assures a higher investment to income ratio and there-
fore a greater rate of growth of output. The classical assertion
seems to hold only for a planned economy where aggregate demand
can be controlled and all output above wages may be used for re-
investment. In such planned economies it is correct to suppose
that the most direct way to promote more investment and further
economic growth is by restricting consumption, but this does not
seem feasible in a non-planned market-oriented economy. This is
15
K. Marx. Capital, Vol. III, Part Iv., pages 267-323. (ed. by
F. Engels) International Publishers Co., Inc. New York, 1967.
16
L.R. Klein. An Introduction to Econometrics, Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1962, page 228.
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not to say that I do not consider the reorientation of consump-
tion to be appropriate strategy for increasing saving/investments.
What I am arguing is that the actual pattern of consumption is
determined by the control of the mode of production and as such
is not likely to change unless there is a new institutional ar-
rangement (e.g., economic planning) governing the ownership/con-
trol of means of production.
To illustrate what is defined by marxists as "unnecessary
consumption", the explanation given by Marx himself in his Grun-
drisse seems to be the most adequate:
"Production furnishes consumption not only
with its object. It also gives consump-
tion its definition, its character, its
finish... The object is not an object as
such, but a specific object which must be
consumed in a specific way, a way which is
again determined by production itself.
Hunger is hunger, but the kind of hunger
that is satisfied with cooked meat eaten
with a fork and knife is different from
the hunger which bolts down raw meat with
hand, tooth and nail. Therefore produc-
tion produces not only the object of con-
sumption, but also the manner of consump-
tion, not only objectively but also sub-
jectively. Production thus creates the
consumer. Production not only furnishes
the object of a need, but it also fur-
nishes the need for an object." 17
In a passage of Capital, Marx also writes:
"It would seem, then, that there is on the
side of demand a certain magnitude of defi-
17
K. Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischn Oekonomie,
Berlin: Dietz, 1853. Translated from the German by
M.A. Nicolaus, page 14.
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nite quantity of a commodity on the mar-
ket. But quantitatively, the definite
social wants are very elastic and chang-
ing. Their fixedness is only apparent.
If the means of subsistence were cheaper,
or money-wages higher, the labourers
would buy more of them and a greater
'social need' would arise for them...
The limits within which the need for
commodities in the market, the demand,
differs quantitatively from the actual
social need, naturally vary consider-
ably Tor different commodities; what
I mean is the difference between the de-
manded quantity of commodities and the
quantity which would have been in de-
mand at the other money-prices or other
money or living condition of the buyers." 18
These two passages link consumption with both the prevailing
class structure and the mode of production. In a classless soci-
ety, the social need for a given commodity depends on the capacity
of society to satisfy this need, and the "felt needs" are uniquely
socially determined. As such they differ from the consumption of
the unnecessaries (unnecessary given the actual level of devel-
opment of the social means of production) which are "induced
needs" determined by the market-oriented mode of production and
distribution. These "induced needs" include the consumption of
luxuries by the upper classes and all the commodities which are
sold on the market for the pursuit of maximizing the profit of
the owners/controllers of capital without necessarily adding any
improvement to the use-value of consumers.
A. Gorz gives among other examples the case of the spread of
disposable packaging for milk products:
18
K. Marx, Capital, Vol. III, op.cit., pages 188-189.
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"From the viewpoint of use value, the super-
iority of milk in a cardboard carton or yo-
ghurt in a plastic cup is nil (or negative).
From the viewpoint of capitalist enterprise,
on the other hand, this substitution is
clearly advantageous. The glass bottle or
glass jar represented immobilized capital
which did not 'circulate': empty bottles
or jars were recovered and reused indefi-
nitely, which entailed the cost of handling,
collection, and sterilization. The dispos-
able containers, on the other hand, allow
a substantial economy in handling, and per-
mit the profitable sale not only of the
dairy product but also of its container." 19
This explains in part why gigantic waste coexists with
largely unsatisfied fundamental needs (needs for basic food
items, education, medical care, housing, etc.) and brings us to
the issue of when "productive" investments are undertaken. In
an economy based on private ownership of individual competing
units, the sum of the decisions of entrepreneurs to produce may
not equal the sum of decisions by other individuals and businesses
to consume and invest. If there is not enough revenue for the
private entrepreneur to both cover his costs of production and
make an additional profit, then he will not continue production
(or will shift to a more profitable line of production). In a
competitive market economy, therefore, only commodities which can
yield the "average" rate of profit (or more), will be produced.
Competition in the market assumes maximum productivity (in an ex-
change-value sense) but not necessarily maximum use-value.
In a market-oriented economy only investments that maximize
19
A. Gorz, Strategy for Labor, A Radical Proposal. Beacon
Press, Boston, 1967, pages 78-79.
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profits are undertaken. What market competition does is to lower
the rate of profit to a "reasonable average".
"The notion that competitition would be a
factor in accelerating technical and scien-
tific progress is thus, in large part, a
myth. Competition does not contribute to
technical progress unless such progress al-
lows for the growth of profits. Technical
progress, in other words, is essentially
concentrated on productivity, and only in-
cidentally on the pursuit of human optimum
in the manner of production and in the man-
ner of consumption." 20
If this assertion is true for competitive units of produc-
tion, this is even more the case in the branches of the economy
where the production of goods and services is controlled by one
or a few units of production which are able to set and control
the prices on the market independently of consumers' demand.
But in making these arguments, I am certainly not arguing
that the confiscation of the "surplus value" consumed by the
capitalists would result in a considerable improvement of the
condition of the working class. I would rather argue with A.
Gorz that what must be attacked is not the personal incomes
created by capitalist profits and the consumption patterns which
these incomes lead to. It is rather the control of the capital-
ists over the apparatus of production and the resulting inver-
sion of real priorities in the model of consumption which should
be denounced.. Ultimately it is the orientation that the process
of capital accumulation impress on the economy and the society
as a whole that has to be reviewed.
20
A. Gorz, ibid., page 81.
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Given this analysis, and in order to understand the limits
and possibilities of the process of economic growth in develop-
ing societies, I consider it to be essential to establish a link
between the investment function as reflecti the decisions of
the owners/controllers of means of production and the consumption
function as deriving from the actual distribution of income and
establish their mutual interrelations.
On the one hand, firms are still conceived to be attempting
to "maximize profits" in the sense that -- with respect to a set
of concrete choices -- they prefer a more profitable to a less
profitable alternative. Thus, if there are a variety of tech-
niques, already known, for carrying out a particular line of
production, investment plans are assumed to be designed to em-
body the technique which promises the highest rate of profit on
the finance committed.
In view of such institutionally engendered behavior, a
higher rate of accumulation requires a higher level of profits,
both because it offers more favourable odds in the risk that is
involved in capitalists' investments and because it makes finance
more readily available. A higher rate of profit engenders
greater investments and an economic reactivation period.
But, on the other hand, the fall in the wage share of
national income during reactivation periods restricts the capacity
to consume which in turn lowers the rate of profit on sales, which
eventually causes a fall in investment, and thus leads to a de-
pression (or recession). In the peak of prosperity large profits
may be translated into a high rate of investment, which has as a
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result a vast increase in the demand for raw materials and ma-
chinery. The rise in prices of capital goods, given their de-
pendency on foreign producers and their unelastic supply, is
far more rapid than the increase in prices of the products they
are used to produce. As a result "there is a squeeze on pro-
21
fits in consumer goods from the cost side" and falling profits
in consumer goods depress the outl~ok for expected profits
throughout the economy causing a fall in investments, thus set-
ting off the depression.
Furthermore, as we are going to see in the next section,
when I will analyze in more detail the cost/price relationship,
if profit-maximization is the rule governing production deci-
sions, then the willingness to alter factor combinations is af-
fected not only by changes in the technical conditions of pro-
duction, but also by changes in factor/price ratios -and invest-
ments will be governed by those decisions. Thus writes Marx:
"The (ordinary) man does not grasp the fact
that it is precisely the change in the cost
of production, and thus in the value, which
caused a change in demand, in the present
case, and thus in the proportion between
demand and supply, and that this change in
the demand may bring about a change in the
supply. This would prove just the reverse
of what our good thinker wants to prove.
It would prove that the change in the cost
21
H. Sherman, Radical Political Economy, Capitalism and Socialism
from a Marxist-Humanist Perspective. Basic Books, Inc.,
New York, 1972, page 90.
Sherman also explains (pp. 86-88) why the wage share of na-
tional income declines in an expansion and rises again in the
ensuing depression.
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of production is by no means due to the pro-
portion of demand and supply, but rather re-
gualtes this proportion." 22
To summarize, a clear description of the mutual dependence
and circularity between production and distribution as reflect-
ing the normal functioning of our socio-economic market-oriented
institutions, can also be found in Marx:
"Supply and demand determine the market-price,
and so does the market-price, and the market-
value in the further analysis, determine sup-
ply and demand. This is obvious in the case
of demand, since it moves in a direction op-
posite to prices, swelling when prices fall,
and vice versa. But this is also true of
supply. Because the prices of means of pro-
duction incorporated in the offered commodi-
ties determine the demand for these means of
production, and thus the supply of commodi-
ties whose supply embraces the demand for
these means of production. The prices of
cotton are determinants in the supply of cot-
ton goods.
To this confusion -- determining prices
through demand and supply, and, at the same
time, determining supply and demand through
prices -- must be added that demand deter-
mines supply, just as supply determines de-
mand, and production determines the market,
as well as the market determines production." 23
All the preceding policies' suggestions which I have been
discussing regarding an increase of internal demand as the most
realistic and efficient way of increasing national output can,
therefore, have grounds for optimism o if it is assumed (or
asserted) that capital equipment in developing countries is not
22
K. Marx, Capital, Vol. III, op.cit., Footnote, p. 131.
23
K. Marx, Capital Vol. III, ppci.page 131.
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likely to be fully utilized given the limited size of the internal
market. I have shown how if we assume full capacity utilization,
these policies would fail to produce the desired effects.
However, as we have seen, the internal demand which is limi-
ted and determined by the actual distribution of income is not
likely to increase considerably in the short run and as such the
increase of output becomes dependent on foreign demand for ex-
ports. But the growth in national exports -- given the current
rules of the game of the international market -- is subject to
the capacity of national products to compete with the goods pro-
duced in developed economies with a more "efficient" mode of pro-
duction. The comparative advantages in favor of the less de-
veloped economies only materialize in very few items generally
in relation to raw materials and food products which constitute,
on the average, some twenty per cent of their total exports.
The International Monetary Fund has published a study on
foreign trade which described the three following trends that
occurred in the last two decades:
"1) the commercial growth of the imperialist countries
was much greater in value than that of the Third World.
2) the imperialist countries have come to depend less
on the Third World for their exports, and
3) the latter has become more dependent on the coun-
24
tries of the capitalist group."
24
International Monetary Fund, International Financial
Statistics, Annual Report, 1950, page 32.
54
Developing countries, acting individually, tend to base
their exports on only a few goods and trade them with only a
very limited amount of buyers, allowing the buyers to easily
exert monopsony power evidenced in the establishment of terms
of trade favoring these buyers.
At the same time, an increase demand for exportable goods
is generally coupled with a parallel increase of imports, pre-
dominantly manufactured consumer goods and capital goods, whose
favorable terms of trade as compared to the primary exportable
goods, only end up by ruining the balance-of-payments of the de-
veloping countries and increase their dependency on the econo-
mies of the developed ones.
So, not only is the expansion and diversification of the
demand for exports not likely to occur, but even if, at best,
some products are placed on the international market,the need to
import the capital goods necessary for their production, counter-
balances any of the benefits derived from an increase of trade.
We have been analyzing the conditions which limit
the variations of the rate of capital accu-
mulation. Let us consider the possibilities of variations in the
"productivity" per unit of capital invested.
l.b. Capital-Output Ratio
In this section I will analyze the variations of the capital-
output ratio and establish how these variations are determined on
and by the market. In other words, I will be arguing that the
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factors of production (capital and labor) are utilized in the
production process insofar as the owners/controllers of the
means of production find it "profitable" to do so, given the
conditions established both in the markets in means of produc-
tion and in essential commodities.
The product per unit of capital is the other variable
which strongly influences the rate of growth of a developing
society. The variation of this variable reflects changes in
technology, natural resources and the labor force. Thus far
as the output per unit of capital may be viewed as determined
jointly by the output per worker and the use of capital per
worker it can be considered to include the incentives and pro-
ductivity of both workers and capitalists/managers; the a-
mounts of labor and raw materials available; the organization
and efficiency of allocation and use of all factors.
Given the fact that the amount of labor and raw materials
available for production can only be minimally and very slowly
influenced by conscious social policies, their analysis will be
left apart and considered to be peripheral to this discussion.
I will concentrate, therefore, on discussing the variations
in the productivity of workers and managers, and the organiza-
tional aspects involved in the utilization of factors. I will
try to show how the market-oriented mode of production determines
their specific characteristics and possibilities of variation.
To initiate the discussion on productive and unproductive
labor a quote from P. Baran seems appropriate:
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"...the mere distinction between pro-
ductive and unproductive labor encoun-
ters a determined opposition on the part
of bourgeois economics. From the experi-
ence of its own youth it knows the dis-
tinction to be a powerful tool of social
critique, easily turned against the capi-
talist order itself. Attempting to do
away with it altogether, it seeks to
quench the entire issue by judging the
productivity, essentiality, usefulness
of any performance in terms of its abili-
ty to fetch a price in the market. In
this way indeed all differences between
various types of labor disappear -- all
except one: the magnitude of the remu-
neration that any given activity commands.
As long as a performance rates any mone-
tary reward, it is treated as useful and
productive by definition." 25
On top of this market-defined productivity, workers whose
activities are non-marketable but constitute essential "indirect"
contributions to the production of marketable output, and workers
who are essential for the preservation and functioning of the
capitalist system as a whole, are also considered to be produc-
tive and rewarded correspondingly.
In market terms, productivity has a very specific meaning
and refers to the potential output of goods and services that a
worker is capable of generating.
In both classical and neo-classical economics the "law" of
diminishing returns has been used to define the limits of this
productivity. The law of diminishing returns states that if
capital, natural resources, and technology remain unchanged and
25
P. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, Modern Reader
Paperbacks, New York, 1968, p. 31.
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if there is a limit to the physical level of output then an ad-
ditional worker will add less product than the worker hired be-
fore him.
The utilization of this "law" in development economics has
been extensive as a justification of the existing patterns of
rewards to labor and capital. The shortage of capital is said
to impose a limit to the level of output long before full em-
ployment is achieved. Once the full capacity level of output
has been attained, the giginal product of labor is said to be
zero, and the reward too (as seen in the next section). But
this assertion also implies that the attainment of full employ-
ment, in a developing economy, is only possible if a substantial
part of the economically active population is economically un-
productive. The only policy foreseen as a satisfactory solution
to promote both economic growth and full employment is to seek
to expand the capital stock per worker at a faster rate than the
growth rate of the labor force, raising progressively the labor's
marginal product. Technological adjustments appear then as the
most effective way of increasing the productivity of labor. How-
ever, these adjustments are of a very specific nature and can
only be undertaken if they are "efficient" on the market.
Let us analyze what this "efficiency" means. Marx's charac-
terization of productivity in market-economies seems relevant:
"The value of a commodity is determined by
the total labor-time of past and living
labor incorporated in it. The increase in
productivity consists precisely in that the
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share of living labor is reduced while that
of past labor is increased but in such a way
that the total quantity of labor incorpor-
ated in that commodity declines; in such a
way, therefore, that living labor decreases
more than past labor increases." 26
But the law of increased productivity of labor is not ab-
solutely valid for capital. So far as capital is concerned,
productiveness does not increase through a saving in "living
labor" in general, but only through a saving in the paid por-
tion of living labor.
Labor will be considered productive, and therefore em-
ployed, as long as it is capable of producing commodities
which are sold on the market, it is labor's "character as the
creative element of exchange value" which is paid and cherished.
It is also in this context that the substitutability between
labor and machinery can be understood and interpreted.
"The use of machinery for the exclusive pur-
pose of cheapening the product, is limited
in this way, that less labour must be ex-
pended in producing the machinery than is
displaced by the employment of that machi-
nery. For the capitalist, however, this
use is still more limited. Instead of pay-
ing for the labour, he only pays the value
of the labour-power employed, therefore the
limit to his using a machine is fixed by
the difference between the value of the
ma chine and the value of the labour-power
replaced by it." 27
26
K. Marx, Capital, Vol. VI, op.cit., pages 260-61.
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K. Marx, Capital, Vol. I (ed. by F. Engels. New World Paper-
backs international Publishers, New York, 1967, p. 392.
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As such the productivity of labor is limited and conditioned
by the mode of production itself. The non-communal ownership/
control ff the means of production confers to labor specific char-
acteristics of productivity, characteristics that would change
in a different institutional set-up.* (I will develop this further
in Section III of this chapter.)
On the other hand, "labor may be necessary without being
productive" in a market sense as indeed is the case for teachers,
artists, physicians, philosophers, etc., that engage in labor the
demand for which in a "rationally ordered society far from disap-
pearing would become multiplied and intensified to an unprecedented
degree."
Baran's definition of unproductive labor as consisting of
all labor resulting in the output of goods and services the demand
for which is attributable to the specific conditons and relation-
ships of the capitalist system, and which would be absent in a
rationally ordered society, appears an an accute characterization
which in some sense echoes Schumpeter's earlier formulation:
"A considerable part of the total work done
by lawyers goes into the struggle of busi-
ness with the state and its organs ... in
socialist society there would be neither
need nor room for this part of legal activity.
This is to say that the institution of non-communal ownership/
control of the means of production confers to the production pro-
cess the characteristic of only "using" the factors of production
(i.e., labor, capital) insofar as they yield on the market, at least,
the expected average rate of profit.
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The resulting saving is not satisfactorily
measured by the fees of the lawyers who are
thus engaged. That is inconsiderable. But
not inconsiderable is the social loss from
such unproductive employment of many of the
best brains. Considering how terribly rare
good brains are, their shifting to other
employment might be of more than infini-
tesimal importance." 28
These differentiations between productive and unproductive
labor are diametrically opposite to their characterization in
market terms and as such it becomes difficult to consider workers
actually unemployed or "unproductive" as unable to contribute to
economic growth in an alternative institutional set-up. This
observation leads us to believe that there is a form of potential
economic surplus which is hidden in the market-oriented economies.
I will try to establish now how the waste and irrationality in
the productive organization also fall in this observation result-
ing in a reduction of output markedly below what could be obtained
with the same input of human and material resources.
In this analysis two steps may be taken. First, on the
national level, excess capacity in plants can be encountered due
to the underutilization of economies of scale stemming from ir-
rational product differentiation and from lack of capital avail-
able to individual firms. But these conditions called forth by
the irrational smallness of enterprises have their counterpart in
the waste on the part of monopolistic giants who, shielded by
28
J.A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New
York, 1950, page 198.
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their monopolistic positions, need not bother with minimizing
costs or with maximizing efficiency and lose therefore the bene-
fits potentially achievable with their plant-size.
Secondly, the organization in the capitalist firm itself
that is defended on grounds of economic rationality and effi-
ciency, also has to be relocated in its correct perspective.
S. Marglin's research addresses the following questions: "Why,
in the course of capitalist development, the actual producer
lost control of production; What circumstances gave rise to the
boss-worker pyramid that characterizes capitalist production;
29
and What social function does the capitalist hierarchy serve?"
Marglin's research leads him to conclude that "neither of
the two decisive steps in depriving the workers of control of
product and process... (i.e., the minute division of labor and
the factory organization of work) took place primarily for reasons
of technical superiority. Rather than providing more output for
the same inputs, these innovations in work organizations were in-
troduced so that the capitalist got himself a larger share of the
30
pie at the expense of the worker..." (emphasis added).
The advantage of capitalist methods of work organization
materialized in bureaucratic production, was to allow the con-
29
S. Marglin. What Do Bosses Do? The Origins and Functions of
Heirarchy in Capitalist Production. Harvard University,
Boston, August, 71, mimeo, page 3.
30
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centration -- in the hand of capitalists -- of control, over the
surplus. Bureaucratic organization does not appear as the only
method for accumulating social capital, as such, but is certainly
an effective alternative for successful control over the produc-
tion process and the capitalist appropriation of the fruits of
accumulation. It was only within the constraints of maintaining
heirarchical control that changes in the work activities were in-
troduced. The current system of production, is not technologically
superior to any of its alternatives but is certainly superior in
securing to both capitalists and managers an essential place and
reward in the production process.
Marglin explains the adoption of the factory system of pro-
duction as follows:
"The key to the success of the factory, as
well as its inspiration, was the substitu-
tion of capitalists' for workers' control
of the production process, discipline and
supervision could and did reduce costs
without being technologically superior." 31
As such the lack of bureaucratic organization tould be dis-
astrous for profits without being inefficient; furthermore, there
are some indications that an alternative organization/division/
control of work could be more beneficial for society as a whole.
(In the last chapter I will analyze this alternative organization
and its indications of success/failure.)
One example in this direction can be the workers' desire to
31
S. Marglin,ii. page 34.
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trade between goods and leisure. The shift from workers' control
of goods-leisure choices to capitalists' control over the workers'
choices between work and leisure through the factory system, as-
sured the capitalist of the ability to forsee his future profits.
"It is a fact well known (wrote a mid-
century commentator) ... that scarcity,
to a certain degree, promotes industry,
and that the manufacturer (worker) who
can subsist on three days work will be
idle and drunken the remainder of the
week... The poor in the manufacturing
counties will never work any more time
in general than is necessary just to
live and support their weekly debauches
... We can fairly aver that a reduc-
tion of wages in the woolen manufacture
would be a national blessing and advan-
tage, and no real injury to the poor.
By this means we might keep our trade,
uphold our rents, and reform the people
into the bargain." 32
The bureaucratic organization must not therefore be seen as a
shift from one production function to another but merely as a
shift along the same production function with a specific control
of the inputs involved in the production process. Furthermore,
all the manpower used in this organization, coordination and
public relation system can make us believe that output could be
increase in an alternative production process.
In this subsection, I discussed how the ownership of the
means of production by the capitalists and their control over the
the production process determine the level of output per unit of
32.
J. Smith, Memoirs of Wool (1747), quoted in S. Marglin, op.cit.
64
capital according to the criteria of profitability established
on and by the market.
In this first part, subsections l.a. and 1.b., I have been
analyzing the factors which determine the direction and speed
of economic growth in a market-orietned developing economy. I
established how our socio-economic institutions determine and
limit both the level and type of production and the use of factors
involved in the production process. In the next part, I will dis-
cuss how possible it is, given the institutions, for the growth
of output to assure a "full-employment" (and) "productive employ-
ment") situation.
2. The Problem of Full-Employment
In this second section I will address myself to the problem
of how likely it is -- given the socio-economic institutional con-
straints analyzed above -- for the "productive" sectors of a de-
veloping economy to grow sufficiently to absorb the entire labor
force. In other words, I will analyze how these constraints in-
fluence the absolute growth of the labor force employed in the
production process. From the analysis of sections 1 and 2 I shall
establish that the variations in output and employment do not
necessarily correlate positively as postulated in neo-classical
developmental strategies but may move in opposite directions
(given our socio-economic institutions). Furthermore, I will
argue in the next chapter that these institutions define the
characteristics of production process in such a way that when
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society has to face a choice between more output and more em-
ployment, the alternative adopted will, in principle, be geared
towards maximization of the satisfaction of the owners of the
means of production (i.e., a small minority at expenses of the
majority).
I start by posing the question: What is meant by unemploy-
ment: In considering the economic situation actually existing
in developing societies, the objective of employment should be
clarified as to distinguish between the creation of more jobs
and the creation of more "labour-time". The creation of more
jobs can be directly related to the unemployment problem defined
as the number of those seeking work at existing wage rates, while
the creation of more "labour-time" depends on the characteristics
of the production process itself and on the existing difference
between the number of hours of work on offer (depending as such
on the technology in use) compared with the number of hours of
work that is taken up. As such full-employment is perfectly
compatible with underemployment and with low productivity per
man (even though productivity per man hour may be high, and high
productivity per man/hour (in developing societies) is not achiev-
able with full-employment). If the primary concern of devel-
opmental policies is to increase the productivity per man hour
then the increase of productivity pF man and the whole notion of
full-employment are only to be seen as desirable by-products.
The main objective pursued becomes the increase of productivity
of labor (i.e., increase the productivity per man/hour) in all
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sectors which has evidently nothing to do with the goal of in-
creasing the available labour time (i.e., the increase of the
productivity per man).
B. de Vries, a senior economic advisor to the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, defined this objective
as follows:
"Let the objective be a society in which
all are employed in activities in which
the most productive methods known to man
are used. This objective may be best
achieved by concentrating on the estab-
lishment of an advanced sector and ex-
panding it rapidly to absorb and inte-
grate those presently engaged in the
backward sector. " 33
This goal of developing the modern sector, with a high pro-
ductivity per man/hour, is advocated on the grounds that its ex-
pansion will suffice to absorb more and more workers actually
employed in l.ess productive activities. How realistic is this
prospect given the rate of growth of the labor force and the di-
rection of technological change in the modern sector? Let us
consider what forces condition and determine the process of
aborption.
2.a. Rate of Growth of the Labor Force
The writings referring to the concept of "optimum population"
go back as early as 1798 to the first edition of Malthus' "Essay
33
B.A. de Vries, "New Perspectives on International Develop-
ment", Finance and Development (Washington, D.C., IMF
and IBRD) Vol. 5, No. 3, September, 1968, page 25.
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on Population" and was elaborated upon repeatedly in all the clas-
sical literature. Decades later, the need of controlling the rate
of growth of population became incorporated in the economic
growth literature dealing with developing societies:
"Capital accumulation, technical progress,
and the phenomenon of increasing returns
to scale may have dispelled the shadow of
Malthus from the few rich industrial coun-
tries, that shadow still hovers over the
many poor agrarian countries ... In
these countries per capita income has re-
mained pitifully low, and the alarming
prospects of population growth have re-
vived neo-Malthusian fears. Once again
there is widespread concern that economic
betterment will be thwarted by excessive
population growth, the 'revolution of
rising expectations' must remain unful-
filled." 34
Although the concept of an optimum population can be consi-
dered to have some theoretical utility in social research, in
practice, it has been of little use in formulating socio-economic
policy. Apart from some modest results produced by physiological
control programs, little seems possible in terms of decreasing
the gap between the actual population size and the size required
in the existing production process. Attempts to control the
growth of population are obviously based on the belief that the
maximization of output does not require the growth of the labor
force and that, as such, the well-being of the working class de-
pends on how big its size is when it comes to "dividing up the pie"
34
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after costs of production, profits, interests and rents have been
discounted. Implicitly, such attempts unwittingly acknowledge
the conclusion we arrived at in the former section; namely,
that the mode of production adopted is determined by the expecta-
tions/speculations of the owners/controllers of capital and not
by the basic needs of the population at large.
Furthermore, I will argue that it is difficult to conceive
of a situation of absolute overpopulation in a developing society.
The so-called labor surplus problem is not a problem of excess
labor per se, but rather a problem of imbalances between the
required and available skills. A high demand for skilled labor
coexists with a shortage in supply, while the supply of unskilled
labor considerably exceeds the demand for it. As such, it can
be considered not as a problem of superfluous social "labor
time" but as a problem for the owners/controllers of means of
production of how to organize production in order to maximize
output given the human resources available. It should be under-
stood that the demand for skilled or unskilled labor is uniquely
determined by the mode of production. The increasing division of
labor in current production processes calls for more and better
coordination and organization. Further technological develop-
ments, along the current trends, require more specialized skills,
and depends on an ever growing technocracy/bureaucracy, and can
absorb less unskilled labor. In the preceding section, we have
seen that the social function of hierarchical control of produc-
tion was to make possible the accumulation of capital and not to
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achieve higher levels of efficiency. This view of the hierarch-
ical division of labor, certainly opposes Hirschman's view, who
sees modern and up-to-date technology embedded in highly system-
atized and hierarchical work situation as
"...perform(ing) a crucial function in aid-
ing management in the performance of new,
unfamiliar and perhaps somewhat uncongenial
tasks. By predetermining to a considerable
extent what is to be done and where and at
what point of time, the machines and the
mechanical processes they perform reduce
these difficulties immeasureably in compari-
son with a situation where work schedules
depend exclusively on the convergence and
coordination of many human wills and actions." 35
What Hirschman and other developmental strategists are ar-
guing for is a division of labor; i.e., a given mode of produc-
tion, which demands exactly what can be considered as being one
of the most scarce resources of developing countries: skilled
labor. The crucial observation to make is not that there is a
surplus of labor in absolute terms, but that by choosing a mode
of production we also determine the specific amounts and ways by
which the "factors of production" (capital, unskilled and
skilled labor) are to be utilized. The specific form in which
these factors are combined depends solely on the methods of
production and the degree of absorption of the labor force becomes
a "dependent" variable, dependent on the intention of owners/con-
35
A. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development,
Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1958,
pages 146-147.
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trollers of the mode of production to increase the productivity
of labor as a means to augment their profits. (I will develop
this argument further in the next section.)
The majority of society, as such, is adapting to technology
instead of technology adapting to society: a basic irrationality,
especially if we have shown that technology was (and is) not geared
to efficiency but to accumulation.
In a similar way, we encounter sectorial imbalances among
indutries with very specific skill requirements; and further ano-
malies as high urban unemployment and agricultural underemployment
coexisting with vast areas of fertile uncultivated land and with
industrial plants working at a very low percentage of their in-
stalled capacity.
In a very pragmatic sense, it is hard to imagine conditions
in which it would be impossible to find anything useful for extra
hands to do. More men and women must surely be able to produce
more in an alternative organization of production, but what we
are facing here are the choices that the owners/controllers of
the means of production have to make in a market-oriented economy
as to what methods of production to use: the more labor-intensive
methods or the more capital-intensive ones. What forces govern
these choices? This is the subject of the following discussion.
(A further discussion will be done when analyzing the shares be-
tween wages and profits - Section II)
2. b. The Choice of Technology.
Baer and Herve make the following observation:
"The difficulties encountered in effectively
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absorbing labor in newer industries in
many industrialized countries were at
first explained principally by the exist-
ence of a rigid factor proportion problem,
in which the choices of techniques were
few and of a relatively capital-intensive
variety. However, the mounting evidence
accumulated in the 1950's and early 1960's
suggests that even where a choice was pos-
sible, many developing countries were not
adopting the most labor-intensive tech-
niques possible or promoting only those
industries which absorbed the highest a-
mount of labor." 36
The trend toward adopting "modern" labor-saving technology
has been especially supported by technical missions of interna-
tional organizations. The main reasons are given:
1. Returns on capital are lower in labor-intensive sectors.
2. Capital per unit of output is higher in the same sectors.
For these reasons, the argument gives, labor-intensive technologies
result in less "competitive" production and in less "attractive"
investment opportunities. Let us examine these arguments.
Low labor productivity is not unexpected in a labor-intensive-
industry, as compared to a capital-intensive one, but what accounts
for the "unsuitability" of the more labor-intensive methods of pro-
duction (in the sense of the method which uses a lower capital/
labor ratio) is that they actually involve more capital per unit
of output than the capital-intensive method and as such require
more of the scarce resource in developing societies: capital.
36
W. Baer and M. Herve. "Employment of Industrialization in
Developing Countries", Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Vol. 80, No. 1, February, 1966, page 93.
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Several empirical studies have been done to examine figures
of costs of production in different production situations and in-
deed they have shown that techniques that use much labor also use
37
much capital per unit of output. How predictable were these
results? Indeed, we could consider these results to be absurd
if all techniques of production were developed simultaneously. If
this would have been the case, neo-classical economists would ar-
gue that in a competitive market, labor-intensive methods of pro-
duction would never have developed. But in fact methods of pro-
duction are developed over a historical period of time and
Marx's thesis on the development of technology seems especially
useful to illustrate this process. His argument is mainly based
on the observation that in order to compete in the market, the
producers have to t-hr-ive for a reduction in their costs of pro-
duction (or increasing the productivity of labor) which leads to
the adoption of cost-reducing (labor saving) innovations. This
adoption assures the producers of a larger share of the market and
extra profits, which compensate and justify for their lowering of
prices in the commodities produced. Historical analysis has
shown how the trends in the technological development process have
been towards more and more division of labor, as well as larger
and larger scales of production correlated with the requirement
of increased lumpiness in investments.
37
See for example United Nations, The Textile Industry in Latin
America, New York, 1963.
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To argue, then, for the adoption of capital-intensive tech-
nology (adapted especially for large-scale production) in devel-
oping societies on the grounds that it reduces the capital costs
in relation to output, becomes a self-evident argument. Obviously,
to be competitive in the international market, either the develop-
ing societies adopt the large-scale production system (with the
economies of scale they provide) or else they will not be able
r
to expet any of their manufactured products.
The higher productivity in the modern technological sector
is likely to always erode the benefits from the utilization of more
labor-intensive techniques even if wages are extremely low. This
has actually been the case in many sectors using "intermediate"
technology. However, this is not to say that in small-scale
production processes oriented towards highly protected internal
markets, the older techniques of production could not remain ef-
ficient//.
To illustrate this argument an analysis can be made of tech-
nological change in Japan, and:
"If Japan's experience teaches any single
lesson regarding the process of economic
development in Asia, it is the cumulative
importance of myriads of relatively simple
improvements in technology which do not de-
part radically from tradition or require
large units of new investment." 38
38
W.W. Lockwood. The Economic Development of Japan: Growth
and Structural Change, 1868-1938. (Princeton Univer-
sity Press, New Jersey, 1954.) Reprinted in K. Marsden,
"Towards a Synthesis of Economic Growth and Social Jus-
tice", International Labor Review, Vol. 100, No. 5,
November, 1963.
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The second argument that is given in favor of capital-in-
tensive techniques is that they yield higher returns to invest-
ments. Already in the mid-fifties Galenson and Leibenstein
urged upon the desirability of high capital intensity in under-
developed countries as a source of profits and therefore of
39
savings and investments. The relation between profits, savings
and investments has already been discussed in the first section.
I still want to emphasize very briefly what the alternative of
increasing the productive power/per worker means for the owners/
controllers of means of production.
Marx had already noted that the productivity of labor increased
the rate of profit:
"the degree of exploitation of labour de-
pends on the average intensity of labour,
if the working-day is given... The degree
of exploitation of labour determines the
rate of surplus-value, and therefore the
mass of surplus-value for a given total
mass of valuable capital, and consequenly
the magnitude of profit..." 40
and that this accounts for the direction of technological progress:
"The progress in civilisation, therefore,
or, in other words, any increase in soci-
ally productive forces, in the productive
39
W. Galenson and H. Leibenstein, "Investment Criteria, Produc-
tivity and Economic Development", Quarterly Journal of
Economics, LXIX, August 1955, pages 343-370.
40
K. Marx Capital, Vol. III, op.cit., page 197.
75
forces of labour itself, if you like -- as
they come about as a result of science, in-
ventions, the division and combination of
labour, improved means of communication,
the creation of a world market, machinery,
etc. -- do not enrich the worker, but only
capital; they only serve, therefore, to
increase the power that controls labour
still further; they merely increase the
productive power of capital. Since capital
is the opposite of the worker, they only
increase objective power over labour. The
transformation of labour (as a living pur-
posoful activity) into capital is in itself
the result of the exchange between capital
and labour, insofar as it gives to the capi-
talist property rights in the product of
labour (and command over labour). This
transformation is first of all established
in the production process itself. The ques-
tion whether capital is or is not produc-
tive is thus absurd. Labour itself is only
productive when taken into capital, when
capital forms the basis of production, and
the capitalist takes command of production.
The productivity of labour likewise becomes
the productive force of capital, just as
the general exchange value of goods is
crystallised in money." 41
The Marxian analysis is useful insofar as it illustrates
the strong relationships existing between the nature of the pro-
duction process with its actual division of labour and the trends
of technological development. As such, given our actual socio-
economic institutions, modes of production will be chosen according
to the criteria of efficiency determined by the operation of mar-
kets and the technological alternatives chosen will always be
geared towards the maximization of returns to capital. These
41
D. McLellan. Marx's Grundrisse. Macmillan and Co., Ltd.,
London, 1971, page 82.
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choices definitely yield greater benefits to the owners/controllers
of capital but do not necessarily lead to the well-being of the
working population as minimally assured by a stable remunerated
job. Evidently the faster the population grows the less likely
the modern sector is to absorb it in "productive activities"; and
this observation allows us to predict that it is more likely for
the actual unemployment situation to deteriorate rather than im-
prove in the future, if the current socio-economic institutions
persist.
In the first section of this chapter,,I have analyzed the
factors which condition the rate of growth of the economy; in
the second part, I discussed the absorption of the labor force
given its natural growth and the direction of technological pro-
gress. The main effort behind the analysis has been to attribute
to the normal operation of our socio-economic institutions, in
particular to the institutions of ownership of factors of produc-
tion and of control of the production process; the actual un-
employment/underemployment problem affecting developing societies.
I have established the inevitability of the problem given these
institutions and as such we can derive that there is nothing in-
herent in them that can justify the optimism of neo-classical
developmental economists regarding the possibilities of "solving"
the unemployment problem. Indeed, there can be some regulatory
policies which can momentarily slow down its gravity but,given the
direct correlation between the socio-economic institutions and the
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unemployment phenomenon they engender, subject to maintaining
these institutionsthe problem will reappear and progressively
increase.
CHAPTER THREE:
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INCOME DISTRIBUTICN : the problem of distributional
equity.
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In this section of the paper I will discuss the factors
which determine the distribution of national income between
wages and profits in a developing market-oriented economy.
The pertinence of this discussion can best be understood if
we have in mind that only 10% of the population of Argentina,
for example, live on an income derived from sources other than
the immediate reward to the product of their work, and that the
"welfare" of the rest of the population is exclusively dependent
on this reward.
As in the earlier section, I will only consider two main
groups of income-earners: the wage-earners and the profit-
earners, as represented respectively by households and firms.
(The case of the self-employed, for example, can easily be
linked to that of the wage-earners given both his level of
income and the alternatives open to him.)
I will ascertain, as Ricardo did in 1820, that the discovery
of the laws which regulate distributive shares is the "principal
problem in Political Economy." But while Ricardo considered
that in "different stages of society the proportions of the
whole earth which will be allotted to each of these (three)
classes under the names of rent, profit and wages will be
essentially different"; I will argue, that today, the problem
of distributive shares becomes crucial precisely because in
"different stages of capitalist society the proportions of the
national income allotted to wages, profits, etc., are essentially
similar. -/Given this observation, I will analyze how the
normal functioning of our socio-economic institutions account
for the relative constancy of these shares despite changes in
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techniques of production, variations in organization of produc-
tion, higher levels of accumulation of capital and increases in
the average real incomes per head as experienced at least in
"the advanced capitalist economies over the last 100 years or
so."
I will oppose this constancy to the optimism of neo-classical
economists as to the possibilities of change in relative shares
as expressed in their marginalist theory of production and their
marginal utility theory of value. To illustrate the views of
these economists, quotes from-j.B. Clark, father of the marginal
productivity theories, seem appropriate:
"Where natural laws have their way, the share of income
that attaches to any productive function is gauged by the
actual product of it. In other words, free competition
tends to give to labor what labor creates, to capitalists
what capital creates, and to entrepreneurs what the
coordinating function creates." 4/
"If he (a man) is to gauge the real importance to himself
of a particular saddle horse, he may, perhaps, do it by
ascertaining how many hours he must work in order to get
enough in the way of boats, guns or a tennis outfit, etc.,
to afford as much pleasure as he can get from the horse...
The final measure in the case is one of pain; for the
ultimate infury that is done to a man by depriving him of
any one means of pleasure, resolves itself into putting him
under the necessity of enduring a certain amount of personal
sacrifice in the effort to secure something that will
effectually replace it... If each man could measure the
usefulness of an article by the effect that it costs him
to get it, and if he could attain a fixed unit of effort,
he could state the utility of a number of different articles
in a sum total. Similarly, if all society acts in reality
as one man, it makes such measurements of all commodities,
and the trouble arising from the fact that there are many
measurers disappears. A market secures this result, for
society acts as a unit--like an individual buyer." 5/
The first statement asserts that each individual in the
economy, receives the value of his contribution to production.
The second, argues that in the absence of market imperfections,
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each individual's income is proportional to his desire to work
i.e., is a function of both his own distaste for the sacrifice
involved in working and of the pleasure/utility he can derive
from acquiring given commodities on the market.
In subsection II.l. I will discuss the first statement and
analyze the forces which influence and determine the actual
share of a factor of production. In subsection 11.2., I will
explore the real possibility, given market-institutions, for
labor to modify its share of the national product.
II.l. The determination of factor shares:
With reference to an individual firm, the marginal productivity
theory needs no elaborate discussion. The demand of a firm for
a specific factor service is determined, under market competition,
by the firm's production function, the prices of the outputs it
produces, and the prices of the various factor services it
uses.
"The individual firm under perfect competition hires
factors according to the equimarginal principle. An
optimum combination of factors implies equalization of the
weighted marginal physical products taken over all the
factors, the weights being factor prices.
P1  = MPk = ... M . . . . . (2) ....
W r c
The competitive firm maximizes profits by equating price
to marginal cost. Profit maximization implies cost minimi-
zation, and the latter is a synonym for payment to factors
in accordance with their marginal productivity." _6
In this passage of M. Blaug's, "Economic Theory in Retrospect,"
MP 1and MPk stand for the marginal productivity of labor and
capital respectively, W for the wage rate, r for the rate of
interest and Mc for the marginal cost. At micro level of the
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firm, the demand curve for labor is logically a function of the
marginal productivity of labor but the problems arise when we
convert this micro-theory of the firm into a macro theory of
income distribution. This is in fact what the marginal pro-
ductivity theory does when it states that each productive
factor will be rewarded, in equilibrium, according to its
marginal productivity as measured by the effect on the total
product of the addition or withdrawal of a unit of that factor
(the supply of all other factors being held constant.) There-
fore, according to the marginal theory, we may say that "if
the total supply of all factors... is being taken as given,
independently of price, and all factors are assumed (in the
theory) to be limited substitutes to one another, the share-
out of the whole produce can be regarded as being determined by
the marginal rates of substitution between them." 7/
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If relative shares have been observed to be constant over time,
neo-classical economists proceed to say, then the marginal rate
.8/
of substitution of labor to capital must have remained unchanged -
However, the only case when the marginal rate of substitution of
labour for capital remains unchanged, at each combination of
labour and capital, is when technological progress takes a
"neutral" form.
"Neutral technological changes include a change in the
efficiency of a technology and/or a change in technologically
determined economies of scale," but it does not include tech-
nological change that is associated with "variations in capital
9/intensity and elasticity of substitution." These "neutral
technological" changes may indeed be thought to occur at the
firm's level, but certainly for theeconomy as a whole, in
advanced economies at least, the trend of technological progress
has shown a move towards higher capital intensity and greater
ease of substitution of labor for capital. As such the
explanation of the constancy of relative shares on the basis of
"neutral" technological change is certainly a highly unsatisfactory
explanation, but it seems that a better and more rigorous under-
standing of the constancy of income shares can not be undertaken
without analyzing first the basic assumptions of the marginalist
school when forewarding such an explanation. In the first sub-
section II.la, I will intend to undertake such an analysis.
In the next subsection II l.b., I will try to derive from
such an analysis, how in order to justify the existing socio-
economic order, neo-classical economists proceed to ignore the
socio-economic institutions ("essences") which determine the
actual distribution of income and only proceed to describe the
"appearances," considering them as being the fair and natural
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rewards to the factors of production.
II.l.a. The marginal rate of substitution between factors
In neo-dlassical economics, the marginal rate of substitution
of labour for capital is understood to be the ratio of the
marginal product of capital to the marginal product of labour.
However, to be able to determine this ratio, a "common numeraire"
that relates both productivities should be established.
The need for such a numeraire has first been discussed by J.
Robinson (1953) and has clearly been restated and summarized by
G.C. Hartcourt:
"The first puzzle is to find a unit in which capital
may be measured as a number, i.e., an index, which is
independent of relative prices and distribution, so that
it may be inserted in a production function where along
with labour, also suitably measured, it may explain the
level of national output. Furthermore, in a perfectly
competitive economy in which there is perfect foresight
(either in fact or for convenience of measurement), this
unit must be such that the partial derivative of output
with respect to capital equals the reward to capital and
the corresponding partial derivative of.output with respect
to labour equals the wage of labour."10/
The finding of such a unit seems indeed to be a unique re-
quirement, if we are to construct the neo-classical production
function, i.e., the iso-product-curve showing the different
quantities of labor and capital which produce a given level
of national output.
One of the main problems arises from the fact that in a market-
oriented economy, it is impossible to conceive of a quantity of
capital which is forewarded in the production process indepen-
dently of the rates of interest and wages. This is to say that
the neo-classical production func~pon can not be constructed
unless the profit and wage rates are known; and these rates are
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exactly what neo-classical economists try to derive from the
construction of the aggregate production function.
Let me develop this point a little further. In the production
of any commodity, capital is advanced and capitalists expect to
earn a profit on such advances. Capitalists invest where the rate
of profits is expected to be greatest, but in a perfectly com-
petitive economy, there is a single rate of profit and all costs
incurred in the production of any commodity are expected to be
recouped with the profits accrued at the competitive rate of
profit, over the period of time (duration of the production
process) during which the capitalist has his capital "out of
pocket." However, the amount of profits depends on the amount
of capital invested; the greater the quantity of capital
invested, the greater the rewards to capital. But for this
capital to enter the production process, capital must be
converted into capital goods and it is this observation that
leads us to an important differentiation which the neo-classical
economists fail to incorporate in their analysis, namely; the
difference between capital and capital goods.
"Capital goods are not the same thing as capital. 'Capital'
has two meanings. On the one hand, it is property in the
means of production, enabling owners of equal amounts of
claims in these means to receive equal returns (given com-
petitive conditions). In this sense it is a homogeneous
fund of value, capable of being embodied in different forms.
On the other hand, 'capital' also means produced means of
production--that is, specific materials, tools, instruments,
machines, plant and equipment, on which,with which, and by
means of which, labor works. In this (latter) sense, it is
a set of heterogeneous, disparate products."11 /
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By not differentiating between capital and capital goods,neo-
classical economists seem to be considering that the "reward" to
capital is a phenomenon independent of the actual form that this
capital takes in the production process. It must be understood
however that "capital",as a homogeneous fund of value, has no
bearing on the actual technological characteristics of production,
it is only when it is converted into "capital goods" (a specific
technology) that it determines the productivity of capital.
But capital can not be converted into capital goods unless the
instruments of production have already a set of prices, prices
which in turn can not be established, unless we take as given
the general rate of profit. The rate of profit appears as
such as a variable whose value has to be known a priori if
capital is to be converted into a specific technology although it
is precisely this value that the neo-classical economists want
to determine from the construction of the aggregate production
function. However, the neo-classical economists still claim
that the relative prices of the factors of production can be
determined uniquely from technical substitutions and the
-capital-output ratio. I will argue that this unique determination
is indeed possible if, and only if, the actual socio-economic
structure is taken as given, i.e., if a situation of socio-
economic equilibrium is postulated. U. Robinson defines this
equilibrium as follows:
This is the definition of equilibrium. It entails that
there have been no events over the relevant period of past
time which have disturbed the relation between the various
valuations of a given stock of goods, and that the human
beings in the situation are expecting the future to be just
like the past--entirely devoid of such disturbing events.
Then the rate of profit ruling to-day is the rate which was
expected to rule to-day when the decision to invest in any
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capital good now extant was made, and the expected future
receipts, capitalised at the current rate of profit, are
equal to the cost of the capital goods which are expected
to produce them.12/
Indeed if the future rate of profit is established on the
basis of the rate of profit ruling to-day, i.e., if we accept
the actual socio-economic structure, then the supply price of
different technologies can be calculated. If these supply
prices are incorporated by the owners/controllers of means of
production as "costs of production," then as wages rise or
fall, different technologies will become more or less profitable.
As such each rate of profit determines uniquely a choice of
13/
technique. - For each technology adopted, on the basis of
the actual rate of profit, a production function can indeed be
drawn connecting different amounts of capital per man employed
with different rates of output and this is precisely what the
neo-classical economists do. Under what circumstances, however,
does the problem of reevaluating the capital goods become
unnecessary,as the wage rises and the rate of profit falls?
This would indeed be the case if the general rate of profit
would equal the marginal product of capital and this would only
be possible if all industries independently of whatever they 14
produce would use capital goods and labor in the same proportions.
If indeed the capital-output ratio is to be equal in all
branches of production, then it can be considered as an
independent variable. Furthermore, if technology is such that
it is expected to provide diminishing marginal returns to the
value of capital per man employed, thenland only then, can the
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changes in relative shares be established on the basis of
technological substitution possibilities and variations in the
supply of factors of production, independently of the on-going
rate of profit. Now, for different industries using different
capital-labor ratio where the wage rate rises, only those
industries with a high capital-labor ratio will be able to
meet this increase in wages, without having to increase their
prices. The industries with low capital-labor will have to
increase their prices. But as competition establishes a
uniform rate of profit among different sectors of production
the relative prices of inputs and outputs of different industries
will have to be resettled. These prices however can only be
established in accordance with the rate of profit as price
determination requires an already "unambiguous, constant and
15/
confidently anticipated rate of profit." -
According to this argument, relative prices (including the
price of labor) are established in the sphere of production and
as such are not dependent on the demand of consumers, (as the
neo-classical market paradigm considers them to be) but on the
'technological interdependences of production.
If we reconsider also the arguments that I have developed
in the previous section, namely the conditions under which
labor is hired, then we can indeed redefine the income
distribution problem altbgether.
We have seen in the preceding section that the marginal worker
is hired insofar as the value of the output he generates is
higher than the wage he receives, i.e., insofar as he is
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"productive for capital." As such the productivity of labor
is reflecting the technological characteristics of production
as determined and defined by the owners/controllers of the means
of production.
If both the level of employment and the wage rate--and
therefore the labor's share-- are conditioned by the technological
conditions of production then indeed the distribution of income
reflects the social relations of production. But given (as
we argued in the last section) that it is society that shapes
technology and not technology that shapes society, these social
relations of production should be understood as governed by
our socio-economic institutions and not by (either) a techno-
logical necessity nor by the dictates of an exogenous variable,
technology, independent of the existing socio-economic structure.
This is to say that the distribution of income between wage-
earners and profit-earners is the outcome of the interdepen-
dencies occuring in the sphere of production,interdependencies
which are crystallized in a specific set of technologies. This
emphasis on the process of production, and as such on the way
the means of production are disturbed is diametrically opposed
to the neo-classical view of markets as rewarding each factor
of production according to its contribution to the production
process.
This is not to say that competitive market conditions can
not bring about an equalization of the rate of profit among
industries, nor that a labor shortage does not produce an
increase of wages but it says nothing about how the profit
and the wage rate are determined in the first instance.
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It is precisely to the analysis of such a determination that
the next subsection will be devoted.
II.l.b. The determination of factors share and socio-economic
Institutions
In this section I will try to explain how our socio-economic
institutions determine the factors share. First of all at a
general level of analysis, and in a market-oriented economy,
the institutions are such that the property in value capital
means that its owners share in the distribution of the national
-income by receiving profits in their invested capital. (Neo-
classical economists pay no attention to whether this income
is earned or unearned and as Solow says, "All that is necessary..
is to draw a conceptual distinction between the imputed return
to capital and the income of capitalists.") At the same level
of analysis, workers can be considered to be deprived from the
ownership of means of production and as such are obliged to
sell their labor in order to survive.
On the basis of such a differentiation between wage-earners
and profit-earners, let us consider how their shares of the
national product can be said to be established.
A certain amount of capital is forewarded by the capitalist
for the production of specific goods and by selling these goods
on the market, the capitalist not only recoupes his costs of
product but also a profit. How is this profit obtained?
Marx's concept of production of surplus-value seems to be
relevant to the understanding of how profits are obtained:
"In buying the labouring power of the workman, and paying
its value the capitalist, like every other purchaser, has
acquired the right to consume or use the commodity bought.
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You consume or use the labouring power of a man by making
him work as you consume or use a machine by making it run.
By paying the daily or weekly value of the labouring power
of the workman, the capitalist has, therefore, acquired the
right to use or make that labouring power work during the
whole day or week...
The value of the labouring power is determined by the
quantity of labour necessary to maintain or reproduce it,
-but the use of that labouring power is only limited by the
adtive energies and physical strength of the labourer. The
daily or weekly value of the labouring power is quite distinct
from the-daily or weekly exercise 'of that power, the same as
the food a horse. wants and the time it can carry the horseman
are quite distinct.
The rate of surplus value., all other circumstances re-
maining the same, will depend on the proportion between that
part of the working day-necessary to reproduce the value of
the labouring power and the surplus time or surplus labour
performed for the capit&list. It will, therefore, depend on
- the ratio in which the working day is prolonged over and
above that extent, by working which the working man would
only reproduce the value of his labouring power, or replace
his wages. 16/
This unpaid. labor is not visible in a capitalist society
since wages, by appearing as the reward to labor, eliminate
the possible distinction between the paid and the unpaid pro-
portion of work. In fact, when wages appear as the reward to
labor, surplus-value appears as the natural reward to capital
under the name of "profits."
Marx makes the distinction between the rate of surplus-value
and the rate of profit. In his terminology, the surplus-
value (s), or profit, consists precisely in the excess value
of a commodity over its cost-price (i.e., the excess of the
total labor embodied in the commodity over the paid labor
embodied in it) and this surplus-value measured against the
variable capital (v; value of labour power) he has called the
rate of surplus-value, and against the total capital (c + v;
c is the value of used-up machinery and raw materials) he has
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called the rate of profit.
If the excess value of a commodity over its cost-price is
compared with the total capital advanced by the capitalist, then
this excess value seems to be derived from all the components of
this "capital" in an equal and amorphous way. Marx considers
the analysis of the rate of profit to be an irrelevant analysis,
dealing with only the "surface of the phenomenon" as he ascer-
tains that it is only the portion of capital that is allocated
to "buy the labour power" that actually contributes to the
formation of the surplus-value. For Marx, even the value of
capital goods'is given by the amount of past labour embodied
in them. But the analysis of the rate of profit seems in fact
to be extremely relevant to the capitalists. No doubt, that
the capitalists consider it a crucial examination, as it ex-
hibits the results of the self-expansion of the capital
advanced and to them the sources of this self-expansion are
not important. Capital invested for the capitalists is
capital invested whether used-up in capital goods or in
acquiring labour power. It is however by looking at the
rate of profit that the process of capital accumulation is
"cloaked in mystery and appears to originate from hidden
qualities inherent in capital itself."
As Marx writes:
"Although the rate of profit thus differs numerically
from the rate of surplus-value, while surplus-value and
profit are actually the same thing and numerically equal,
profit is nevertheless a converted form of surplus-value,
a form in which its origin and the secret of its existence
are obscured and extinguished. In effect, profit is the
form in which surplus-value presents itself to the view,
and must initially be stripped by analysis to disclose
the latter. In surplus-value, the relation between
capital and labour is laid bare; in the relation of
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capital to profit, i.e., of capital to surplus-value that
appears on the one hand as an excess over the cost-price
of commodities realised in the process of circulation and,
on the other, as a surplus more closely determined by its
relation to the total capital, the capital appears as a
relation to itself, a relation in which it, as the original
sum of value, is distinguished from a new value which it
generated." 17/
S
Why is, however, the analysis of the rate of profit (_ )
c + v
important? Clearly, the rate of profit is relating the
differentfactors of production. The fact that labor cannot
work without machinery and raw materials; and capital goods
cannot produce without the collaboration of labor, is, to some
extent, transcribed in this formulation of the rate of profit.
But, by no means is the nature of the interrelation between
capital and labor captured. It simply tells us the amounts of
constant and variable capital utilized in the production process
without even attempting to specify the characteristics of the
technological dependency between labor and capital that
brought these amounts into being. Indeed the technological
dependency is such that capital goods and labor are "designed"
to fit each other perfectly. Skills, conditions of work, pro-
ductivity of labor are determined technologically and as such
it is impossible to consider at all the factors of production in
isolation of each other. (It is, however, precisely on such
an independence that the whole marginalist theory relies and
calls upon to justify the unequal returns to factors of production.)
The question arises as to how can we determine the contribution
of each factor to the production process, given such an inter-
dependence. Once again, the more we analyze the external
manifestations of the economic system, the more its internal
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structure disappears. With the tendency of the rates of profits,
(and to 4 certain degree of wages) to equalize among different
branches of production; profits do not appear in direct relation-
ship with the degree of exploitation that each capitalist imposes
on the labor force in his branch of production. Furthermore, the
division of profits into rent, interests... tends to obscure
completely the fact that profits are the outcome of the surplus-
value generated by the workers in the production process.
To understand the way the division between wages and profits
is established, we have to move beyond the world of appearances
and ask how is it then, that society through its socio-economic
institutions, materializes this.division, independently of
what occurs in one or another branch of production. A market
in labor converts the worker into a commodity whose "market
price," according to classical economists (i.e., Ricardo, A.
Smith) corresponds to a subsistence wage:
"The working man will, on an average, only receive the
value of his labour, which resolves into the value of his
labouring power, which is determined by the value of the
necessaries required for its maintenance and reproduction,
which value of necessaries finally is regulated by the
quantity of labour wanted to produce them."18/
Marx did not only relate wages to minimum physiological
needs but also to "the satisfaction of certain wants springing
from the social conditions in which peole are placed and reared
up." According to Marx, this "historical or social element"
entering into the value of labour, may be expanded or contracted,
so that nothing remains but the "physical limit"; but we also
have to understand that even this notion of physiological
minimum is an elastic one. A need that has been created by
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technical progress and the power of demonstration becomes a
physiological need over a certain period of time.
In the preceding section, we have already discussed the need
for the capitalist to induce "artificial wants" in society in
order to enlarge the market for his products and therefore his
profits.)
If needs are socially determined, then we can understand why
wages in an historical perspective, can be seen as varying
considerably in space, but very little in time. Their fluctuation
only seems to have a strong lower limit, a limit under which a
social crisis would become eminent.
To understand the upper limits attainable by the wage rate,
a quote by A. Emmanuel seems relevant:
"Upward fluctuations are also limited because labor
power is not a commodity like others. It is a commodity
that is, so to speak, instantly perishable. The worker
cannot save it up so as to take advantage of a favorable
- market conjecture. Every hour that passes is an hour
lost." 19 /
If the workers are indeed, obliged to sell their labor in
order to survive, i.e., if they must work now, even if the
wages are low; then their bargaining power becomes almost
illusory. However, the range of possible fluctuations in the
wage rate is primarily regulated and limited by the variations
in the rate of profit. If "the capitalist and workman have
only to divide this limited value, that is, the value measured by
the total labor of the working man, the more the one gets the
a 20/less will the other get and vice versa"; -
then the following passage of Marx's "Wages, price and
profit" becomes easily understandable:
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"As to profits, there exists no law which determines
their minimum. We cannot say what is the ultimate limit
of their decrease. And why cannot we fix that limit?
Because, although we can only say that, the limits of the
working day being given, the maximum of profit corresponds
to the physical minimum of wages; and that wages being given,
the maximum of profit corresponds to such a prolongation of
the working day as is compatible with the physical forces of
the labourer. The maximum of profit is, therefore, limited
by the physical minimum of wages and the physical maximum
of the working day. It is evident that between the two
limits of this maximum rate of profit an immense scale of
variations is possible. The fixation of its actual degree
is only settled by the continuous struggle between capital
and labour, the capitalist constantly tending to reduce
wages to their physical minimum, and to extend the working
day to its physical maximum, while the working man constantly
presses in the opposite direction.
The matter resolves itself into a question of the
respective powers of the combatants. _1/
The concepts of power and struggle are alien to the neo-
classical literature. In this literature, these concepts are
unnecessary as conflicts are resolved in and by the market.
Market mechanisms are expected to resolve these conflicts,
independent of the socio-economic structure. M. Dobb has
described this belief in the operation of markets as follows:
"The methodology of modern economics (unlike that of
classical political economy) has tended to make economics
essentially a theory of exchange-a determinate theory of
price relationships between things which appear on a
market as objects of sale and purchase...
What is customarily called distribution is nothing more than
an extension of the general theory of price relations from
products to factors of production, the latter being treated--
in complete abstraction from the individuals which supply
them, and the social relations of those individuauls--
simply as productive services which enter the market be-
cause there is a demand for them derived from the demand
for the final product... Excluded are such considerations
as the ownership of the means of production and the class
relations contingent thereon. Excluded is any notion of a
distinction between cost payments and a surplus, which formed
the crux of the classical approach to questions of distri-
bution... The only 'system' which can occupy an economist's 22/
attention is the market system--the form of price determination.
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In neo-classical economics, this price determination is
said to be settled through market mechanisms, which makes it
appear as if prices were established independently of the social
relations of production and simply an automatic operation. How,
then, does this differ from the classical approach? In the
classical world, exchange relationships were regarded as being
essentially determined by the conditions of production and not
by market conditions.
Exchange ratios were, for the classical economists, not
simply relations of exchange but social relations. Exchange
was considered to pertain to the "sphere of the apparent and
the phenomenal" and production to the "sphere of the essential
and the substantial". Marx considered these exchange ratios
to be determined by the relative quantities of embodied labour
in various commodities and it is these quantities which,
according to Marx, confer on them their values. Although
with the development of capitalism it is easy to see, Marx
says, that the average prices at which commodities normally
tend to sell, diverge appreciably from their values, in his
much-criticized statement "the sum of prices of production of
all commodities produced in society...is equal to the sum of
their values" still ascertains that for the economy taken as
a whole the "labor theory of value" holds. This is to say that
S
what Marx calls the "rate of exploitation" (V), i.e., the re-
lation between the surplus labour and the necessary labour, is
of primary importance in determining prices, even in later
"capitalistically modified" societies.
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R. Meek's reformulation of the Marxian view seems relevant
to elucidate this point:
In a commodity-producing society of the modern capital-
ist type, the labour-capital production relationship
still determined the distribution of the national income
between wages and profits--i.e., it determined the total
amount of profit available over the economy as a whole
for allocation among the individual capitalists. As
capitalism developed, changes certainly occurred in the
mode of allocation of this profit between industries and
enterprises, but these changes were logically and histori-
cally secondary. The socio-economic production relation
between workers and capitalists, determining as it did
the proportion of the national income available for al-
location in the form of profit, was still in a meaningful
sense the primary and determining relation. Given the
total amount of profit, and given the amount of capital
employed in producing each commodity, the profit consti-
tuent in the price of each commodity, and therefore its
"price of production", were automatically determined. 23/
We can derive from this analysis that the distribution of
income between workers and capitalists is mainly determined by
the relationship of labour to capital (or its degree of exploi-
tation). It is precisely the relationship between unpaid to
paid labor which determines the relative shares between wages
and profits. The observation that in the historical development
of capitalism the importance of capital has increased only allows
us to conclude that the distribution of profits among capital-
ists is proportional to the capital they employed in the pro-
duction process but by no means can we derive from such an
observation what the rewards to labor should be.
The neo-classical theory has been incapable of explaining
in a convincing way why relative shares have remained fairly
constant over time. On the basis of the previous analysis,
how can we try to explain such a constancy? In the next section
I will try to explore some of the processes by which socio-
economic institutions allow this constancy to occur.
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11.2. The variations in the labor's share
First of all let us consider the case where upon an increase
of the "costs of living", workers would demand for an increase
of wages. In such a case:
In insisting upon a rise of wages, the laborer would only
insist upon getting the increased value of his labour,
like every other seller of a commodity, who, the costs of
his commodities having increased, tries to get its in-
creased value paid. If wages did not rise, or not suf-
ficiently rise, to compensate for the increased values of
necessaries, the price of labour would sink below the
value of labour and the labourer's standard of life would
deteriorate. 24/
Furthermore, if money wages rise and their increase brings about
a new increase of prices, the only result is the iniation of an
inflationary spiral, without bringing about any improvement in
the workers' condition.
"Inflation... is one manifestation of the struggle over
125/
who gets the surplus" -. The wage-earners' struggle for an
increase in their wages and the capitalists thrive for an in-
crease in their profits.
In other circumstances, money may be de- or revaluated.
The relation between the values of necessaries and that of
labour may remain unchanged, but normally changes in money
prices are not equally distributed among all sectors and as
such, at best these changes modify the consumption patterns of
the consumers and at worst they decrease the total purchasing
power of the working class.
Finally in analyzing the relative power of wage and profit
earners, the trend towards further and further mechanisation in
the production process should be discussed.
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As a response to an increase in wages, capital will tend to
increase its productivity through the development of the pro-
ductive powers of labour. This in turn allows for the process
of capital accumulation to be accelerated (even with a high rate
of wages) and simultaneously with the accumulation of capital,
a progressive change in the "composition of capital" takes place.
That part of the aggregate capital that is laid out for machinery
and raw materials increases as compared with the part that is
laid out in wages.
"If the proportion of these two-elements of capital was
originally one to one, it will, in the progress of industry
become five to one, and so forth... In the progress of industry
the demand for labour keeps, therefore no pace with the accumu-
lation of capital" -.
This excess of labour, that Marx calls the "reserve army",
by increasing the competition among workers, allows the capitalist
to push the "value of labour more or less to its minimum limit".
Furthermore, as Marx points out, the process of industriali-
zation may indeed lower the "relative" position of the working
class:
By virtue of the increased productivity of labour, the
same amount of the average daily necessaries might sink
from three to two shillings, or only four hours out of
the working day, instead of six, be wanted to reproduce
an equivalent for the value of the daily necessaries.
The working man would now be able to buy with two shil-
lings as many necessaries as he did before with three
shillings. Indeed, the value of labour would have sunk,
but that diminished value would command the same amount
of commodities as before. Then profits would rise from
three to four shillings, and, the rate of profit from
100 to 200 percent. Although the labourer's absolute
standard of life would have remained the same, his relative
wages, and therewith his relative social position, as com-
pared with that of the capitalist, would have been lowered.
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If the working man should resist that reduction of relative
wages, he would only try to get some share in the increased
productive powers of his own labour, and to maintain his
former relative position in the social scale.27/
The processes I have described indicate the procedures by
which the capitalists are able to recoupe some of the benefits
that the working class had previously obtained through a wage
increase. These processes clearly show that as long as there
is a division between labour and capital, the distribution of
the national income between wages and profits is the outcome
of the struggle between two opposite interests.
Throughout the whole analysis I have considered society as
formed by only two main groups, wage and profit earners. However,
I still want, at least to mention, the role of the State in
influencing the relative shares of these two groups. The tax
system,' the fiscal and monetary policies, the general develop-
ment plans that the State adopts--as exemplified in the first
section by the analysis of Argentina--certainly influence the
relative shares. This is to say that the control of the State
by one group in society allows this group to increase its share
of the national income.
The State can also appear as a mediator between the two
groups but insofar as these two opposite interests are crystal-
lized in two institutions namely, the market in labour that
that obliges the worker to sell his labour and the non-communal
ownership of means of production which allows the owners of
capital to derive profits from this simple right; the role of
the State remains secondary. The income shares are clearly
determined and defined by these institutions. It is only the
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changes in the relative power of both groups that can slightly
modify the shares.
However, in the historical development of capitalism it is
the power of capital that has really increased. The process of
technological development, which in fact as we have seen is
conditioned by the owners of means of production, has converted
capital into the scarce and cherished means of production (as
compared to labour), and its owners have been able to exert
more and more control and power over those who are deprived
from such an ownership. This has turned the struggle between
the two classes into a mild dispute on the working conditions,
the level of wages...
Marx has written on these "struggles":
(The workers') struggles for the standard of wages are
incidents inseparable from the whole wages system... in
99 cases out of 100 their-efforts at raising wages are
only efforts at maintaining the given value of labour
and... the necessity of debating their price with the
capitalist is inherent in their condition of having to
sell themselves as commodities. 28/
and it is precisely this condition of workers having to sell
themselves as commodities that should be questioned, if the
actual pattern of income distribution is considered at all as
a problem.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE: the problem of alienation
in market-oriented societies.
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For more than two centuries now, capitalism has been criticized
on the ground of distributing unevenly the benefits of socio-
eonomic development. Large masses of individuals, belonging to
the working class, although contributing with all their "labor
power" to the production process, benefit only marginally from
the surplus they generate, while the owners /controllers of the
means of production seem indeed to benefit disproportionally in
relation to their contribution to production. In Section III,
I have discussed how given the historical trends in the develop-
ment of capitalism, unemployment and underemployment appear as
structural problems generated by the normal functioning of our
socio-economic institutions. As such the likelihood for a great
majority of the population, especially the unskilled labor force
(but certainly not exclusively), to remain/become unemployed seems
to be extremely high if technological progress and organization
of production are to follow the same path as in the past decades.
Furthermore, in Section IV, I have argued that even if
employed, the possibility of the working class as a whole to
enlarge its relative share of the national income is limited by
the actual distribution of the means of production and the
capital intensiveness characteristic of the production processes.
As capitalist countries become more and more affluent the
desire for an equitable distribution of material goods and
services among workers, and between workers and non-workers in
society, is still an important and relevant concern, on the
political arena; but new interests, in much broader issues, has
also emerged and developed. These are issues related to the
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quality of life in capitalist societies: i.e., to the meaningful-
ness of work, to the capacity of self-expansion of individuals, to
the degree of communal integration. Affluence has not made indi-
viduals happier and counter-cultural and radical movements are
increasingly questioning the basic socio-economic institutions
which engender our actual quality of life.
If indeed, developing societies are to follow the same path
that the developed societies have followed in the past, then
their concerns should not only be geared towards achieving dis-
tributional equity but also and primarily, towards reconsidering
the nature and characteristics of human activities in society.
The vast majority of the developing societies are organizing today
their productive structure along the same lines than the developed
societies did a few decades ago. They use the same organization
in production, a comparable distribution of means and outputs of
production, an analogous technology, etc. Therefore they have to
take into account not only the concrete potentials of this
system of production as to the provision of goods and services
but also the correlations between such a system of production
and distribution and the broader issues related with the quality
of life in capitalist society.
Rarely in the social sciences, do social scientists have the
possibility of foreseeing the outcomes/consequences of specific
modes of human interactions. This unique chance for the social
scientists of developing societies to see in the developed societies
the reflection of their own future can not and should not be under-
estimated. It should be considered with all seriousness as the
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analysis of the present quality of life and culture in advanced
capitalist societies may indeed point to the search for an alter-
native mode of economic development and social organization in
developing societies. But in order to undertake such an analysis
we must first argue that in market-oriented societies the basic
relations of individuals to themselves, to their work, to their
communities are alienated. I will establish this by describing
in subsection III.a. the nature of this alienation. In subsection
III.b. I will try to show that alienation is a social problem
engendered by the normal functioning of our socio-economic insti-
tutions, and finally in subsection III.c., after having analyzed
the processes by which alienation is institutionalized, I will
consider the possibilities of overcoming it.
III.a. The Nature of Alienation
In order to discuss alienation we must first make clear what
meaning we will attach to the term.
I shall try to describe very briefly what sociologists have
considered in the last decades to be the most important components
of the alienation syndrome, namely the feelings of powerlessness,
isolation, meaninglessness and self-estrangement.
Let me try to summarize these feelings.
Powerlessness refers to "the expectancy or probability held
by the individual that his own behavior cannot determine the
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occurrence of the outcomes or reinforcements he seeks". 2 In this
sense powerlessness refers to anything from the immediate work
process to the broader economic and political processes of
society. This sentiment can either be objective or subjective
depending on whether individuals are indeed controlled by other
individuals or by an "impersonal power" i.e., technology, the
establishment, etc....
Isolation refers to the fact that in actual society indivi-
duals belong only to functional groups but not to true communities
in which they can cultivate their talents and relate to each other
in a real "humane sense". It is only in communities that personal
freedom is possible and that man does not feel isolated from
himself, from his fellows and from nature.
Meaninglessness refers to the inability of individuals to
perceive the cause-effect relationships between what they do/
conceive and the outcome of their actions/thoughts. Individuals'
roles do not seem to have any organic link with the structure of
the roles in society nor with any form of social organization.
As such man does not engage himself in any type of activity
which is rewarding in and by itself, any act of creative self-
expression. All relations/activities become instrumental. Hence
his feeling of estrangement from the "species" and from his true
self. Given this meaning of alienation, I will try to show now
how this phenomenon is generated by the actual socio-economic
organization of society.
Within the classical and post-classical philosophical systems
the problem of "alienation" has been conceptualized as some type of
107
privation between the "one" and "its other". Alienation is seen as
the deprivation of man. The human agent participates in the con-
struction of his world and it is intrinsic to this process of
creation that these "constructs" become independent objects.
Anything which we, as human beings fabricate or produce, project
out of our own body (and mind; i.e., the Hegelian idea) and become
separated from us. As such any kind of labor, is alienated labor
because in any society and under any social relations of production,
human beings are obliged to become separated from the products of
their labor. This process has been described in the Hegelian
philosophy as the process of externalization (Entausserung) and
the central motif of the whole philosophy becomes one of restoring
the relation of man with himself in his "otherness": society,
culture, environment. The basic means of overcoming human alienation
is then through this process of reappropriation and the crucial
question to ask is how can this reappropriation take place.
Bourgeois thinkers (including Hegel) always argued that re-
appropriation can only take place through the "reign of reason".
It is only Marx, who for the first time, overcame the conceptuali-
zation of alienation as the alienation of consciousness and re-'
jected the process of "spiritualization" as the unique meansof
man to fulfil his desire of self-relective transcendence and
liberation.
For Marx, reappropriation can only take place through
material praxis. Marx has argued that all reifications are in-
cluded in the dialectic of work and alienation cannot be destroyed
until there is a material change in this praxis.
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However, the main difference between the Marxian concept
of alienation and this of his predecessors, is that Marx denies
the fact that the separation of ourselves from the product of
our labor does necessarily imply that the product of our labor
must oppress us. As such, according to Marx, alienation is not
the result of the projection of things out of our body but is
rather due to the organization of society.
"More concretely, (according to Marx) only in a society
which is based on commodity production and only under the speci-
fic economic and social circumstances of a market economy, can
the objects which we project out of us when we produce, acquire
a socially oppressive existence of their own and be integrated
in an economic and social mechanism which becomes oppressive and
exploitative of human beings. "3
For Marx, transcendence as such is not only spiritual but
also and mainly practical resulting from specific forms of
social and economic organization.
In this section I will ask to that extent does this Marxian
position hold and to what degree is it really descriptive of the
alienation phenomenon in the industrial societies of the XXth
century.
109
III.b. Alienation and Socio-economic Organization
In this section I will argue that in market-oriented
economies the alienation of the individual stem from the normal
operation of our basic institutions. I will develop this argument
in some detail in relation to the alienation from the work-process
and the work-product (given the central theme of this dissertation).
Alienation from community and self will only be treated peri-
pherally.
But before examining the specific causes of alienation in
market-oriented societies, it is necessary to remind very briefly
how this phenomenon existed in different previous stages of human
history.
The most primitive forms of alienation arise from the di-
vergence between human needs and the human desire to control nature.
"Alienation is... a social expression of the fact that men
lack adequate control over the forces of nature and have thereby
not yet acquired control over sources of daily sustenance." -
But as such, in primitive societies, men are oppressed by nature,
but not by the products of their labor. In early history, pro-
duction remained simple but collective, the producers had control
over their process of production and the disposition of their
product. Man was alienated from nature, but not from himself and
his community. However,
"Civilized man's growing control over nature was
attended by a loss of control over the basic conditions of
his economic activity. With the extension of the social
division of labor, more and more goods became converted
into commodities and entered exchange in the market. The
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producers thereby lost control over their product as it
became subject to the laws of the commodity market. In
turn, these laws came to rule the producers to such an
extent that in time men themselves became commodities to
be bought and sold. Slavery was the first organized 5/system of alienated labor; wage labor will be the last." -
Division of labour, in a broad sense, already characterized
pre-capitalist societies wherein the dominant class secured itself
hierarchical privileges in a self-legalized framework. But in
feudal societies men were tied to the land and although they were
not free men, they had access to the land, could produce their
own means of subsistence and keep part of it for themselves. It
is only in capitalist societies that a large part of society was
driven off the land and therefore had no longer access to the
means of production. In order to survive, men were then forced
to sell their labor power on the market. Thus the first pre-
condition for the alienation of labor occurs when labor becomes
separated from the basic means of production and the second, and
interrelated one, where,in order to survive, man had to sell his
labor.
As such, the historical groundwork for the alination of the
working class can be said to be the private property in the means
of production and the institution of wage labor, i.e., the market
in labor, by which men are forced to sell their labor power to
another person, the capitalist. This, however, can only come into
existence on a large scale when and if the free access to the means
of production and subsistence is denied to an important part of
society.
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Marx writes in the Capital:
"(The feudal social organization's) annihilation, the
transformation of the individualized and scattered means
of production into socially concentrated ones, of the pigmy
property of the many into the huge property of the few, the
expropriation of the great mass of the people from the soil,
from the means of subsistence, and from the means of labour,
this fearful and painful expropriation of the mass of the 6/
people forms the prelude to the history of the capital." -
Capitalism has emerged as an economic system which was to
establish human freedom and emancipation by liberating peasants
and serfs from previous "unhuman" conditions of production. I
will certainly not argue that the feudal mode of production was
indeed "humane", because it certainly was not, but my main argu-
ment will be that although less brutal, or unhealthy, the capitalist
mode of production is certainly less than truly human and far from
having liquidated the phenomena of alienated of man has maintained
and institutionalized it.
How does the alienation of man take place in the capitalist
mode of production? In order to explain this phenomen I will
analyze three characteristics of the capitalist mode of production,
namely its division of labor, its wage system, and its orientation
towards the production of commodities.
III. l.b. The division of labor
The actual minute division of labor was already prescribed by
the early proponents of capitalism. Adam Smith's defense of it,
is well known: ~
"(This) great increase of the quantity of work, which, in
consequence of the division of labor, the same number of
people are capable of performing, is owing to three different
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circumstances; first, to the increase of dexterity in every
particular workman; secondly, to the saving of the time which
is commonly lost in passing from one species of work to another;
and lastly, to the invention of a great number of machines which
facilitate labor and abridge labor, and enable one man to do the
work of many. 2/
The division of labor can be seen to contribute to the indi-
vidual's alienation (as we have defined it above), in the following
way. The worker, in a capitalist society, is powerless to control
his immediate work. He has to abide to detailed job specifications
which are elaborated on the top and hierarchically transmitted.
These specifications include everything from the way of performing
the task to the pace of production. Furthermore, the division of
labor renders the worker's task meaningless for him. Production
is fragmented into so many tasks, that not only does each single
individual experience his work as being impersonal and standardized
but also he feels his incapacity to act on the basis of his own
insight. When this feeling is present, sociologists have argued,
that the individual's capacity to participate effectively in the
social life of his/her community is notably reduced. Job power-
lessness and meaninglessness is transferred to the larger socio-
political setting. 8/
Furthermore, fragmented tasks preclude work solidarity and
cooperation. Workers can not determine their social interaction
in the work place. This interaction is indeed directly determined
by the hierarchical division of labor. As such the worker feels
isolated in his work-situation.
If work is socially considered to be the major possible outlet
for human initiative, creativity and craft, then the personal
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experiences of the auto workers on the assembly line can certainly
not be considered to fulfil these social beliefs about what work-
processes should be like. During the productive process by virtue
of the division of labor existing in capitalist enterprise, all
the knowledge, direction and creativity is concentrated in the
hands of the owners/controllers of capital and the workers are
converted into mere adjuncts to the machine.
If so alienating for the workers, why is then this minute
division of labor conserved?
We have seen, that bureaucratic organization and hierarchical
control are the concrete modern manifestations of the worker's
alienation from his work-activitiesbut why was this organization
in production implemented? H. Gintis writes on this subject:
"...In firms of greater complexity, the requirements of
secure control fom the top dictates an increasing number of
levels in the hierarchical ladder of authority. Thus the
modern form of bureaucratic order in production is born.
Bureaucratic order protects the firm against decentralized,
participatory, and "bottom-up" decision-making, all of which
threaten the determination of technologies and work-roles
according to profit criteria. Because of its flexibility
in promoting control from the top, this form of work organi-
zation has been taken over intact by most of the state- 9
socialist countries in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe." -
Most of the neo-classical economists have argued that bureau-
cratic organization and hierarchical control are immutable aspects
of "industrial technology" and should be defended on grounds of
greater efficiency and productivity.
We have seen however, in Section I of this paper, that the
fact that capitalists choose a hierarchical division of labor as
a means to both maximize profits and control does not necessarily
imply that the bureaucratic order in production is itself technically
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efficient. This has indeed been proven both historically and
10/
empirically.
If workers could indeed perform all tasks and coordinate the
activities among them, then the role of the capitalists/managers
would become odd. A system of worker control, job rotation, equal
participation is certainly not advantageous for the bosses insofar
as their existence becomes less justifiable. This does not mean
however, that the division of labor is neither necessary nor
efficient. Since the Industrial Revolution, innovations have
always been directed towards the hierarchical, fragmented capitalist
firm. But based on a study by V.H. Vroom, "Industrial Social
Psychology," H. Gintis writes:
"First, bureaucratized and routinized tasks do not flow
from the nature of "technology" but from the needs of
centralized control... That is, given that the corporate
unit is based on centralized control, the most efficient
technologies will be those involving routinized, dull,
and repetitive tasks. In a decentralized environment, the
exact reverse would be true.
Second, workers do not like fragmented jobs. The experi-
mental literature shows that job enlargement and decision-
making control on the part of workers increases their satis-
faction, while lowering absenteeism and turnover (Vroom,
pp. 199-201). Nevertheless, managers have organized the
normal bureaucratic division of tasks so that actual worker
performance is substantially independent of the worker's
attitudes and satisfactions. This startling, counter-
intuitive fact is one of the major results of fifty years
of investigation by industrial psychologists (Vroom, p. 199).
Third, bureaucratic organization of production, while
insuring managerial control and corporate security against
the vagaries of workers morale, is by no means efficient in
the wider sense. For even moderate worker participation in
decisions and goal-setting increases productivity (Vroom,
p. 228). The mean quality of decisions made by a group is
moreover greater than the mean quality of individual decisions
(Vroom, p. 230), and the best results are obtained when
individuals think up solutions individually, and evaluate and
choose among them as a solidary team (Vroom, p. 232-3)...
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...when workers are given control over decisions and goal-setting,
productivity rises dramatically (Vroom, pp. 234-6).
As P.Blumberg (Industrial Democracy, Constable, 1969) concludes:
"There is scarcely a study in the entire literature which
fails to demonstrate that satisfaction in work is enhanced or...
productivity increases accrue from a genuine increase in worker's
decision-making power. Findings of such consistency, I submit,
are rare in social research...the participative worker is an
involved worker, for his job becomes an extension of himself
and by his decisions he is creating his work, modifying and
regulating it."
But such instances of even moderate worker control are
instituted only in marginal areas and in isolated firms
fighting for survival. When the crisis is over, there is a
return to "normal operating procedure." The threat of
workers escalating their demand for control is simply too
great, and the usurpation of the prerogatives of hierarchical
authority is quickly quashed. Hence, efficiency in the broader
sense is subordinated to the needs of bureaucratic control.l1/
But if not more efficient what accounts historically for the
displacement of the worker-controlled systems of production by the
capitalist factory system? H. Gintis argues that the answer seems
to lie in the system of hierarchical control according to which
the supervision in the factory allowed the capitalist to increase
the pace of work and the exertion of the worker. And as such
the capitalist firm was able to reduce drastically labor costs and
increase profits. In a later stage, the possibility of greater
capital accumulation allowed the capitalist to invest in new
machinery which indeed increased the productivity of the factory
system; it allowed him also to acquire considerable patent rights,
to advertise and enlarge his markets, to obtain economies of scale,
to benefit more and more from an initial positive condition, this
initial condition was the exertioni of the worker.
This is also to say that we are not arguing against division
of labor per se but against the division of labor which takes
in the capitalist mode of production and which results in the
alienation and exertion of the worker through its minute speciali-
zation of tasks and functions, its hierarchical organization and
its system of bureaucratic control. As such we have to understand
the difference between this division of labor and a social division
of labor which is communally determined and emerges from a dialectic
of technical development and the specific requirements of allo-
cations of tasks (as opposed to the requirements of control and
exertion) and takes into account the non-fragmental characteristics
of work and the need for job rotations.
This social division of labor is certainly
incompatible with the phenomenon of wage labor and it is to the
analysis of this phenomenon that I turn now.
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The Wage System
A significant step in the explanation of the phenomenon of
alienation has been taken by Marx in his analysis of the institution
of wage labor.
First of all, the workers obviously do not exercise the
slightest control over the condition of their employment. Indeed
they can be hired and fired at will and obyiously the greater the
labor supply, the lower the incentive of the employer to increase
the rewards, the job desirability, the working conditions. The
lower the worker skills, the smaller his choice over different
positions with variable degrees of desirability. It follows that
Marx was at least partially justified in contending that the
employee's labor is "not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced
12
labor".
But even more important for the worker's alienation is the
authority relation built in between the worker and his employer
through the working contract. According to this contract, for
an established wage, the worker is obliged to accept all the
orders supplied to him by his employer. Even before he engages
in the production process, the wage-earner gives away his labor.
The worker agrees to hand over his labor power to the capitalist
in return for the payment of the prevailing wage. The employer
is then free to use and exert this labor according to his own
will. But the more the productivity of labor increases i.e.,
the more efficient the workers are; the shorter the work-time
118
needed will be and the lower the direct benefits for the worker
himself. Hence his feeling of powerlessness which adds to his
feeling of meaninglessness when, incapable of understanding the
capitalists' decision-making process which results in the commands
he receiveshe must still abide to them in order not to lose the
job.
But the worker is not only in antagonism with his employer,
he is also in competition with his fellow workers: the workers
who enter the market in labor are necessarily compelled to buck
one another for available jobs. Hence their feeling of isolation,
individualism and competitiveness. Furthermore at the end of the
production process, the product which the worker has produced does
not belong to him but to the capitalist who has hired him. There-
fore the worker is not only alienated from the process of his work
but also from its product. This product does not reflect the
workers' personal contribution to the production process nor does
this product ultimately contribute to the workers' welfare. The
worker has no control over the attributes, or the distribution and
use of the product of his activities. Rather their determination
lies in the hands of the owners/controllers of means of production
who relate the development of products to the rationale of profit
and saleability. Work appears no longer as a means of self-
expression for anybody who sells his labor; work is just a mean to
attain a goal and that goal is to earn some income and have some
free time. Money is expected to buy the consumer goods necessary
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for the satisfaction of human needs and leisure-time is supposed
to allow for human development outside the sphere of production.
In the next sub-section I will argue that in a class society
geared towards the production of commodities neither the satis-
faction of the consumer, nor the development of individuals in
their leisure-time can occur.
The Consumer Society
Most of the arguments of this subsection have already been
treated in greater detail in previous pages but they will be
repeated here very briefly, for the clarification of the thesis
I want to develop.
For most workers, their work activities represent indeed the
least preferred activities they habitually undertake. As such
they are not motivated by the process of production itself, nor do
they identify with the work-product as they have no say as to what
is to be produced, how it should be used and who should use it.
This alienation of the worker from both his work and his
product requires that the motivation to adequate job performance
should be through an external reward which in capitalist societies
take the. form of money and status. Work is thought to have no
value in itself. It is simply a "pain" which one has to put up
with, in order to have the pleasures of consumption.
We have seen before that the capitalist's control of production
take two basic dimensions: the control over the mode of production
and the control over the orientation of production. The latter
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dimension explains why the capitalist economy functions in a way
in which only commodities which respond to the criterion of
"economic rationality" are produced, i.e., the criterion of
profit and control maximization govern not only the production
process but also the products it outputs. In short production,
which is controlled by the owners of the means of production,
control the human needs themselves.
In writing about the mode of production in advanced industrial
society, H. Marcuse says:
"(Technology has become) totalitarian to the extent to
which it determines not only the socially needed occupations,
skills, and attitudes, but also individual needs and
aspirations. " 13
The choice of individual and social means and ends become
manipulated by the internal "rationale" of an economic-technological
system which responds to a given structure of ownership/control
of means of production. The organization of production will be
geared towards the maximization of output i.e., the generation
of ever more vast amounts of marketable goods and services,
independently of the social value of these goods and services.
The criterion for the production of commodities is not their
intrinsic social usefulness but its saleability on the market.
Thus while capitalist economies tend to produce more and more,
there is an ever growing tendency for this production to take
the form of irrational, non-welfare-producing output. -4-
For Marx, the understanding of the commodity form and the
fetishism of commodities is crucial to the analysis of the
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capitalist system.
In interpreting Marx's theory of alienation T.O. Schroyer
writes:
"This central disruption (fetishism) alienates all
practical activity because the commodity form dominates
all productive activity. The commodity is the grotesque
created by the Capitalist mode of production; it is the
unit-cell of alienation. In the commodity form is found
the record of the alienated work process and the immanent
contradictions of Capitalist society. The commodity form
is a duality: it has both a use-value, which is derived
from "real" labor value, and a "Schein", or "show" value,
which is exchange-value, and is but a refraction from the
Capitalist mode of production. " 15/
It is clear, Marx argues, in the Capital, that man changes
nature/materials in such a way as to make them useful to him.
But while for the worker, the object of his work has an intrinsic
value (if produced for his own consumption and enjoyment); within
society work and commodities make sense only in relation to other
commodities. Commodities are valued in relation to how they
exchange for other commodities, in terms of the general value
form: money. As such the capitalist production is only valued
in relation to its products' exchange value.
"In the end, it is money relations between things that help
us objectify the 'meaning' of our actions. This is the language
of commodities, which we must superimpose on life activity.
Abstract relations between things become the standard of "meaning"
16 /for relations between people, their work, and products." -
For Marx, the fetishism of commodities has resulted in the
transformation of human production into forms of human relations
based on money, exchange and trade. Relations between men become
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relations between things and as such, the entire institutional
framework of the market-oriented society does not only create
and legitimize alienated labor but also legitimizes the general
system of human relations in capitalist society as exchange relations.
"The Fetishism of commodities has its origin...in the
peculiar social character of the labor that produces them.
As a general rule, articles of utility become commodities,
only because they are products of the labor of private indi-
viduals or groups of individuals who carry on their work
independently of each other. The sum-total of the labor
of all these private individuals forms the aggregate labor
of- society (gesellschaftliche Gesamtarbeit). Since the
producers do not come into contact with each other until
they exchange their products, the specific social character
of each producer's labor does not show itself except in the
act of exchange. In other words, the labor of the individual
asserts itself as a part of the labor of society, only by
means of the relations which the act of exchange establishes
directly between the products, and indirectly, through them,
between the producers. To the latter, therefore, the
relations connecting the labor of one individual with that
of the rest appear, not as direct social relations between
individuals at work, but as what they really are, material
relations between persons (sachliche Verhaltnisse von
Personem) and social relations between things." 17/
In market-oriented societies it is clear that the form of
economic interactions also regulates and determines the variations
of non-economic institutions: i.e., the family, the community,
the environment, the cultural system. The basic economic insti-
tutions of the capitalist system--the capitalist control of the
productive process with its correlated free market in labor and
its supporting legal relations of property ownership--, do not
only conflict with the interests of the workers, alienating their
work and converting them into commodities, but also by removing
any economic activity from the basic consumption unit/family/
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community, obliges these non-economic institutions .to make indi-
viduals compatible with the economic roles they have to perform
in order to survive and as such lose their social/humane charac-
teristics.
The phenomenon of functional reduction of all social insti-
tutions to the criterion of economic rationality governs the
development of society as a whole, alienating man not only from
his work, but also from this species-being, his culture, his
environment. Alienation, as such is extended from the employment
situation into the leisure hours. Individuals appear as alienated
from the products they produce as they are vis-a-vis the objects
they consume. Instead of defining themselves in terms of what
they are able to create, "people recognize themselves in their
commodities, they find soul in their automobile, hi-fi set,
18
split-level home, kitchen equipment". -
Various explanations have been forwarded for the extension
of the alienation syndrome from the act of production to the act
of consumption. The neo-classical view rejects altogether this
alienation in consumption and claims that individuals prefer higher
levels of consumption to creative work. But more realistic, some
other writers--Galbraith for example--accept the phenomenon of
consumer alienation and attribute it to the manipulations of
"Madison Avenue" which create "artificial wants" in order to
increase the benefits of the corporate sector. (It is the pro-
ducer's sovereignty.) In contrast with these two
positions,. the radical literature, as we have seen before,
attributes alienation to the normal development of capitalism.
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The operation of its basic institutions reduces all aspects of
social life to their instrumental role of maximizing individual
commodity production and consumption and as such eliminates all
meaning for human life, alienating individuals from themselves,
from their communities and their environment. But how does
indeed the alienated man relate to his community and environment?
So far I have described the Marxian view of the.alienation of
man in capitalist society; I will proceed now to explore, how
Marx defines and analyzes the phenomenon of alienation from
community and culture.
Marx argues, that in a class-based society, where the worker
is separated from the means of production, work instead of being
the embodiment of human potential and creativity becomes the
annihilation of the active powers of man. Insofar as we see human
work as the externalization of human potential in a "dialectical
interaction between man and nature" we can view human work/products
as sources of human development and enrichment. But under capitalism
work is its own negation, and as such destroys man's possibility of
self-realization.
Marcuse describing the Marxian view of alienated labor writes:
"Labor in its true form is a medium for man's true self-
fulfillment, for the full development of his potentialities,
the conscious utilization of the forces of nature should take
place for his satisfaction and enjoyment. In its current
form, however, it cripples all human faculties and enjoins
satisfaction. The worker 'does not affirm but contradicts
his essence.' Instead of developing his free physical and
mental energies, he mortifies his body and ruins his mind."19/
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Because of his alienation in work, Marx argues, man is also
estranged from his "species-being". Unfettered self-realization
through unalienated labour would lead to the fulfillment of what
Marx called man's species life:
"It is just in his work upon the objective world that
man really proves himself as a species-being. This pro-
duction is his active species-life. By means of it nature
appears as his work and reality. The object of labor is,
therefore, the objectification of man's species-life; for
he no longer reproduces himself merely intellectually as in
consciousness, but actively and in a real sense, and sees
his own reflection in a world which he has constructed.
While, therefore, alienated labour takes away the object
of production form man, it also takes away his species life,
his real objectivity as a species-being, and changes his
advantages over animals into a disadvantage in so far as
his organic body, nature is taken from him. Just as
alienated labour transforms free and self-directed activity
into a means, so it transforms the species life of man into
a means of physical existence." 20/
Each individual, according to Marx, potentially represents
humanity as a whole and his development leads to that of the
universality of man. The true history of mankind is, for Marx,
the history of free individuals. Under the conditions of
capitalist production man by being separated from his means of
production and from his creative power becomes "unfree" and so
does then humanity as a whole.
As such, man can only overcome his alienation/unfreedom
through a practical transcendence as the fundamental characteristic
of man is his capacity of self-actualization through work. But
Marx's concept of "work" is quite distinct from that of "labor".
And this appears clearly in Chapter VII of Capital entitled
"The Work Process".
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Work, in the Marxian sense is both a world-building and a
self-realizing activity. Work has a unique dialectic:
"The work dialectic is that rationally conceived purposive
action which, step by step tries to achieve the changes de-
sired, and is characterized by an open reciprocity of ends
and means as the work proceeds...
Work is "making" which also reflexively "forms" men...
Work then, applies to politics, as well as to producing and
distributing goods and services. The highest form of work
is (for Marx) the revolutionary praxis, that guided by a
critical dialectic 'makes' the revolution." 21/
For Marx, de-alienation alone is not enough; "men must change
the world and not interpret it." But men cannot change the world
given their false-consciousness (which they develop through the
total alienation of work which produces an inversion of human
understanding, in that relations between men are seen as relations
between things). According to Marx, the fetishism of commodities
(as described in the earlier subsection) results in a "political
economy which find the phenomenal forms of exchange, trade and
money, as the "real" categories of human production, and, as such,
22
have mystified and thus ideologically legitimated alienation." -
Hence, the false-consciousness of the alienation worker who
accepts as true all the values, norms, ideologies which legitimate
the alienated work-activity, with all its corollary of alienation
from self, from community, from culture, from environment.
Capitalism "develops a working-class which by education, tradition
and habit looks upon the conditions of that mode of production as
self-evident laws of nature".
False-consciousness has permeated the entire institutional
framework of the market society, creating not only a legitimation
for alienated labor but also a legitimation of "reified mutual
recognition systems" by which individuals relate to each other
as "things".
The development of dominant ideas always keeps step with
increasing social and economic integration but this process is
to stop in a classless society as "it is no longer necessary to
represent a particular interest as general or the general interest
as ruling" 23/ and man reappropriates his true essence as a
human being. As such, for Marx, the development of a critical
theory of false-consciousness is just of secondary importance,
his basic concern being the theoretical understanding of the
"economic laws of motion" of capitalist society geared towards
concrete revolutionary practice.
In this section we have shown how man in capitalist society
gets alienated in his everyday life from both his work-activities
and his work-products, hence from his self and his community. It
is clear however, that basically different relations in production
and relations to products require alternative socio-economic insti-
tutions to the ones actually existing in market-oriented societies.
Clearly alternative work-activities require the elimination of the
market in labor and the possibility of the workers' control of
production, and the attachment to product requires the integration
of the community and the destruction of the institutionalized
markets in the factors of production.
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Clearly, too, the elimination of hierarchy in production
implies income equality, hence the destruction of a market-
determined income distribution and the destruction of a bureau-
cratic organization will bring along the development of techno-
logies responsive to the needs of the workers and not to the logic
of profit and control. Commodities will be produced according to
needs and not on the basis of their saleability on the market.
As such, the Marxian view is correct when ascertaining
that the alienation of man relates to the organization of society
and is not intrinsic to the "nature of work", in the abstract.
Hence the theory of alienation is useful in showing us that
unless basic socio-economic institutions are changed, humanity
will not be able to overpass its present crisis and achieve its
full.historical development. Our interest is however, more
concrete. How can we turn this theory of alienation into a
theory with concrete/practical implications for social change?
It is to the understanding of these implications that I turn now.
III.c. 'Alienation, Consciousness and Social Change
The theory of alienation was crucial to Marx to examine the
structure of capitalist economic relations, occuring in the society
of the XIXth century, which he was analyzing, from the vantage point
of their contradictions. (The essence of man, community, culture...
is negated by the capitalist mode of production.) This concept of
contradiction is at the base of the materialist dialectic of Marx
(and is present also in the Hegelian idealist dialectic); and the
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main function of any science, according to MarxDin-particular
that of Political Economy, is then to reveal these contradicitons.
Indeed, this belief is motivated by the "conviction that the given
facts that appear to common sense as the positive index of truth
are in reality the negation of truth, so that truth can only be
established by their destruction." 24
The analysis of these contradictions is at the basis of
understanding of the operation of the socio-economic institutions
which govern society and as such at the root of any possibility of
real ("true") social change.
The emphasis on the economic institutions which govern society
is however even more important in advanced industrial societies
than it was in the society of the XXth century as centralized
productive forces have become increasingly powerful. We have
seen that this increase of power has been possible through the
development of technology and the further functional rationali-
zation of institutions; and it is precisely this greater techno-
logical and organizational rationality which hides even more the
basic contradictions of the capitalist system and mystifies its
problems.
"Social conflicts are social problems to be dealt with by
instrumental techniques; administrative pluralism functions in a
co-operative rational manner which acts jointly against those who
reject the logic of domination which is inherent in the whole.
The contradictions of a capitalist society can not develop in a
society which has the technological capacity to contain them and
negate the oppositional dynamic which could be mounted on them.
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Marx's theory of development of internal agencies of social re-
solution is therefore contradicted by the capacity of the system
to "deliver the goods". All potential opponents, or agents of
social change, are absorbed by the 'Schein' of rationality". 2 5_
Human consciousness becomes reified into an acceptance of
the "rationality" of society. Capitalism society is indeed not
failing in its own terms; it is still delivering abundantly
goods and services, but this certainly does not mean that the
capitalist system is satisfying basic human needs. It supplies
however what it claims to the source of need satisfaction but
"the crucial observation is that this claim is open to the every-
day, phenomenal, critical testing by worker and citizen. The
dialectic of consciousness thus lies in the phenomenology of
everyday life, and revolutionary struggle must make this its
organizational principle. "26/
This objective lack of need-satisfaction will lead to the
increasing deviancy of social groups and it will certainly be
these "less socialized groups" of society which will initiate the
political struggle against the existing order.
But how can this dissatisfaction be translated into basic
social change which involves the destruction/modification of the
socio-economic institutions which govern society and create the
basic alienation of man from his self, his culture and his
environment? I argue that this "goal" can indeed only happen
if a comprehensive counter-culture based on a socialist ideology
is developed. This implies the development of a socialist con.
sciousness that can only be built through the union of two
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interrelated tasks, namely the discovery of "true consciousness"
by a return to the phenomenology of everyday life and the practical
struggle to change our basic socio-economic institutions.
Indeed, this counter-movement/struggle should be regarded as
a social movement because what is at play is society as a whole.
As such it should go into precisely the phenomenology of our
everyday lives for a correct perception of the source of the
problem and the potential for solution. Consciousness of our
everyday alienation derived from the critical analysis of self,
society and its "natural" socio-economic institutions, and the
constant struggle to change the basic institutions which had
originated this alienation emerge therefore as two distinct but
interrelated and complementary moments for the creation of any
emancipation of society.
In this section, I have showed how the theory of alienation
is useful in explaining the underlying causes of the present crisis
in capitalist society. In particular, it convinces us that the
operation of its basic institutions converts "man" into "objects",
by reducing all aspects of individual and social life to their
instrumental role in assuring the perpetuation of the actual
social system. We have also explained and argued for the need
to "demystify" the rationality" of the system through a shift
in our consciousness.
This analysis, together with the ones undertaken in the
previous two sections permit us to derive concluding remarks
to which I now turn.
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In the introduction I proposed to investigate -the problems of
unemployment, inequality and social alienation in market-oriented
developing societies. I suggested that these problems are neither
aberrations nor temporary dysfunctionalities, but are by and large
the logical and historical outcomes of the normal functioning of
the basic socio-economic institutions actually existing in these
societies. I developed this argument in two parts.
The first part, which is developed in the first chapter, takes
a concrete socio-economic development, the one of Argentina during
the last two decades and proceeds to analyze the particular dimen-
sions and characteristics that these problems take in this society.
In this section, I focused on the analysis of the theories/policies
used to explain/solve the problems of unemployment, inequity and
social welfare in Argentina.and realized how the stated objectives
of solving these problems failed to become a reality. I then asked
myself the question of whether this impossibility/incapacity of
achieveing these stated objectives is specific to the Argentinian
context or if the failures are rather inherent to the normal func-
tioning of the institutions which characterize market-oriented
developing socieites.
The second part of the thesis (Chapter II through IV) intends
to investigate this question. Indeed, the next three chapters try
to relate the problem of unemployment (Chapter II), the problem of
distributional equity (Chapter III) and the problem of social
alienation (Chapter IV) to the normal functioning of the basic
socio-economic institutions of market-oriented societies.
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In Chapter II, I analyze the factors which determine the rate
and the direction of economic growth in these societies, and proceed
to consider whether this rate and direction lead towards the ab-
sorption of the labor force in "productive employment."
I argued that the process of economic growth in a developing
economy is mainly dependent on the rate of capital accumulation of
that economy and on the productivity of capital. I proceeded to
explain how the consumption/saving ratio depends on the prevailing
class structure and as such how it reflects the social relations in
production. I also discussed the characteristics of the production
process in market-oriented societies, and established that the use
of factors of production (Capital, Labor) is determined in and by
the market. Products are only produced insofar as they can be sold
on the market (market in commodities) and the use/productivity of
the factors of production abides to the criteria of profitability
which reflects the conditions of the markets in factors of pro-
duction and essential commodities.
I argued that if indeed, the incentives to produce, the use
of technologies and the organization in production are determined
in and by the functioning of these markets, then production processes
will take a labor-saving character. This will create problems of
unemployment and serious imbalances in the labor force between the
required and available skills.
In Chapter III, I discussed the problem of distributional
equity and argued that despite changes in the productivity of labor,
its share of the national income has remained constant through time.
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I explained this constancy by showing that shares can not be deter-
mined by possibilities of technological substitution in production
and the supply of factors of production, alone and that indeed the
distribution of income reflects the social relations of production.
I explained why income distribution should not be understood as an
"exchange of equivalents" on the market, but rather as a market
return to owned, or controlled means of production. The non-communal
ownership/control of factors of production is responsible for the
struggle between the wage-earners and the owners of means of pro-
production for a greater share of the national income. I described
the characteristics of such a struggle and concluded that the
possibilities of the wage-earners to increase their shares over
time are extremely limited by the need of the wage-earner to sell
his labor in order to survive, (even under unfavorable working
conditions) and by the large pool of labor that is willing to
abide to these unfavorable conditions. In Chapter IV I discussed
the problem of social alienation and argued that in market-oriented
societies all social relations are governed by the criteria of
economic rationality. As such, all relations between individuals
are transformed into exchange relations between things, and man
is converted into a "commodity" which is used to produce/consume
other commodities.
I argued that these "exchange relations" are institutionalized
through the market in labor which converts the worker into a wage-
earner who relinquishes control over both his labor and the product
of his labor and through the market in commodities which operates
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as a "material incentive" to man to trade his leisure time for
consumer goods (in the general framework of the "more you have,
the better you are").
I argued that unless we transform our basic socio-economic
institutions, man will continue to be alienated from himself, from
his community and his environment and I stressed the need to
"demystify" the rationality of the "System" through a shift in
our consciousness, as a necessary task in the practical/concrete
attempt to change the basic institutions.
In Chapter II through IV, I established the relationship between
the problems of unemployment, distributional equity, and social
alienation and the normal functioning of the basic socio-economic
institutions which actually exist in market-oriented societies. I
showed how these institutions provide the structured environment
within which decisions (political, economic, social) are made and
how they affect (if not determine) the actual decisions taken, con-
cerning the conditions, characteristics, and distribution of
essential roles and resources in society.
The problems of unemployment, inequity and alienation do not
appear any longer as dysfunctionalities of specific societies but
as the necessary consequences of the normal operation of these in-
stitutions which shape our social roles and determine the allocation
of our resources.
Individuals/firms' decisions determine only in the most
immediate sense the shape of social roles and the allocation of
resources. Indeed, the owners/managers of a firm decide what is
to be produced, under what conditions it should be produced, how
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production should be organized, but these decisions are circumscribed
by the institutional environment. The prices of factors of pro-
duction, the prices of products, the technology available are
determined by the market. Producers will employ resources and
organize production to minimize their costs and maximize their
profits (or those of the owners or stockholders of the oligopolistic
firm).
We saw too, that workers can only "bargain" over "excess"
profits, profits which are left over after costs of production,
dividends, interests, etc... are deducted from total revenue.
Thus, the distribution of income, the organization of production,
the development of technology, the development of communities, the
destruction of the environment are all basically directed through
the operation of market institutions, with some modifications
introduced by the decisions of the private sector.
Institutional power shape and govern our everyday life and
social development, with restricted possibilities for individuals
or groups in society to fight politically over specific level of
wages, welfare programs, income redistribution systems, conditions
of work, etc. (within the general outcomes already established by
the markets).
Thus to change the course of historical development requires
a change in economic institutions and any social movement oriented
towards the achievement of goals of equity, equality, responsiveness
of institutions, integration of community necessarily leads towards
the replacement/modification/adaptation of the core institutions
governing our societies.
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The most important institutions, that I have been referring
to, throughout this thesis, have been the institutions of: 1) non-
communal ownership/control of factors of production (capital, land
and labor) according to which the owner has full control over their
use and development; 2) a market-determined income distribution;
3) a market in labor, with specific characteristics of workers'
control over their labor and the products of their labor; 4) a market
in commodities including food, shelter, medical care, etc.; 5) the
owner/managers' control of the production process; 6) and the State
as a class mediator, invoked to correct the dysfunctionalities of
the other markets, but not intended to question them.
Hence a viable and desirable alternative set of institutions
must be developed as a critical element of a strategy of social
change. In an alternative institutional set-up the problems of
unemployment, distributional equity and social alienation would
not arise (others would certainly appear). This alternative should
include 1) the separation of income from ownership of factors of
production (including labor); 2) the community control of resources
and production; 3) the elimination of the actual hierarchical.
division of labor and bureaucratic organization in production
(where possible, sharing of necessary alienating work should be
pursued); 4) basic consumption goods should be available to all
on a non-market basis, and irrational production should be
eliminated.
This alternative can not be materialized in one year, nor in
ten, nor probably in a generation, but the first step towards it
can be and should be done now.
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"The philosophers have only interpreted the world
in various ways; the point, however, is to change
it."
Marx: Theses on Feuerbach
